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2 THE MODERN AMERICAN 
In 1872, Charlotte E. Ray was the first African-American 
women to be admitted to the bar in the United States.  Despite her 
superior legal abilities and the path she so bravely forged for all 
minority female attorneys, she soon gave up the practice of law 
because she could not attract sufficient clients to stay in business. 
Though the legal landscape of our country has undergone 
drastic changes since Ms. Ray’s time, the difficulties she experi-
enced a woman of color in the legal field still plague the profes-
sion today.  The acknowledgement of this problem and the desire 
to find solutions recently spurred the American Bar Association to 
release a report entitled Visible Invisibility: Women of Color in 
Law Firms.   The 2006 report is a culmination of surveys, focus 
groups, and other research that asked male and female lawyers to 
discuss their career experiences, motivations for staying in a law 
firm, reasons for leaving a law firm, and salaries.  After compar-
ing the data of minority female attorneys to that of other groups, 
the report uncovered marked differences between the experiences 
of minority women and their counterparts.  The report not only 
addresses these challenges but also presents solutions to some of 
the problems it brought to light. 
Given the subject matter of this report, when it was brought to 
the attention of The Modern American, it sparked significant dis-
cussion.  However, though the focus began with the experience of 
minority women, we soon found ourselves discussing the chal-
lenges faced by any person who finds that they identify with mul-
tiple minority groups.  As a direct result of that conversation and 
our own attempts to push the boundaries of the issue, our second 
annual spring symposium is entitled: Retaining the Two-fers: The 
Opportunities and Limitations Facing Those Within the Legal 
Field Who Identify with Multiple Minority Groups.  Our goal is to 
present stimulating discussion of the topic, featuring a panel of 
accomplished persons in the legal field who can speak to the issue 
based on their own experiences and observations.  Given that 
many of our subscribers and readers are employees of or are soon 
to be employees of law firms and other legal institution, we think 
it is especially important that you join us for this unique discus-
sion.  We hope that you will not only enjoy discussion of such a 
timely and important issue, but that you will also take the tools 
that you learn from our talk back to your respective places of em-
ployment, institutions of learning, and daily life. 
As evidenced by events like our symposium, we are pleased 
to say that The Modern American continues to be dedicated to our 
goal of providing our readers with a forum for frank, yet healthy 
discourse of the issues facing America’s minority groups.  As has 
become our custom at this time, we would like to take a few mo-
ments to inform you of our recent accomplishments.  First, as of 
last semester, you can now find The Modern American on 
v.lex.us, a new online international legal database. 
Additionally, as mentioned in prior issues, we are working 
hard to make our decision to provide a third, summer issue of The 
Modern American a reality.  Therefore, we are pleased to an-
nounce that this year’s summer issue will be the result of the col-
laborative efforts of The Modern American and the WCL chapter 
of the Latino/a Law Student Association (LaLSA).  The summer 
2007 issue will commemorate the recently held Tenth Annual His-
panic Law Conference – The Voice of the Latino/a Lawyer: Ac-
complishment and Challenges.  Like the topic suggests, the issue 
will feature articles and other written works pertaining to the legal 
issues relating to the experiences of the Latino/a attorney and 
community as a whole.  If you have any interest in being a part of 
this ground-breaking issue, please see our submission guidelines.  
We strongly encourage you to submit your piece for what will 
surely be a stimulating issue. 
In summation, we would like to extend a warm thank you, 
first, to our staff who truly exhibit admirable levels of dedication 
to the mission of The Modern American.  We would also like to 
thank our ever-expanding board of advisors.  Their diligent advice 
and words of encouragement continue to inspire us and stay our 
focus. 
   Sincerely, 
   The Executive Board 
   The Modern American 
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THE DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF PROTECTING AMERICA’S 
 CHILDREN 
 
By Jennifer E. Jones* 
T he Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has the unequivocal power to regulate indecent broadcasting consisting of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communica-
tions.”1  Recently, indecency regulation has inspired much de-
bate between the public, broadcasters, courts, and the FCC.  In-
decency regulation exists to protect only one distinct group of 
people - children.  Yet, current indecency enforcement is not 
prosecuted on behalf of the interests of children.  FCC indecency 
investigations are fueled almost exclusively by complaints sub-
mitted by watchdog groups with politically conservative agen-
das.  Consequently, instead of protecting children and facilitating 
diversity in the media, the FCC’s policing of public airwaves has 
effectuated cultural and political homogeneity of public air-
waves. 
This Article exposes current inconsistencies in the stated 
policy aims of indecency regulation and the statutory require-
ment that the FCC facilitate diverse media broadcasts.  First, this 
Article discusses FCC indecency regulation generally.  Second, 
this Article describes the stated policy aims of indecency regula-
tion and the inconsistencies of indecency enforcement in advanc-
ing those aims.  Lastly, this Article discusses the discriminatory 
impact current indecency regulation has on broadcast media.   
THE POWER TO REGULATE INDECENCY 
Essentially, “[o]ne breast and two seconds after the Janet 
Jackson incident, America became immersed in a cultural war 
between two competing interests - the broadcasters’ right to ex-
ercise their constitutional right to free speech and the FCC's 
power to regulate indecent programming.”2  The Supreme Court 
has long held that broadcasters have limited First Amendment 
protection given the unique role which broadcasting occupies as 
a medium of expression.3  More recently, the Court has recog-
nized the need to balance First Amendment free speech rights of 
broadcasters and indecency regulation interests of the govern-
ment, while keeping with previous decisions which permitted the 
government to limit broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.4   
Both the Court’s recent appeal for caution in free speech 
restrictions and the FCC’s proffered justifications for limiting 
free speech have provoked strong broadcaster reactions.  The 
FCC’s sole justification for limiting broadcaster rights is the 
“need to protect our children.”5  The premise in all indecency 
precedent is that between certain hours of the day children are 
uniquely susceptible to broadcasts and should be protected from 
indecent material.6 
However, heavy critique exists regarding the enforcement of 
indecency regulations and whether this regulation is even neces-
sary at all.7  Interestingly, a source of criticism comes directly 
from FCC Commissioner Adlestein who stated that the FCC has 
failed to “address the many serious concerns”8 raised in previous 
cases and that FCC regulations are “arbitrary, subjective and 
inconsistent.”9  Commissioner Adlestein claims the FCC’s rul-
ings do not adequately consider the “totality” of broadcast pro-
grams.10  Ultimately, the FCC’s failure to completely consider 
and review broadcast programming is inconsistent with court-
mandated analysis in restriction of speech cases.11   
For example, the Supreme Court held in Denver Area Edu-
cational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., that 
broadcast material is subject to indecency regulations when ma-
terial is broadcast at times when children are reasonably likely to 
be in the audience.12  However, the Court has cautioned the gov-
ernment in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union that inde-
cency regulation cannot restrict the adult population to watching 
only what is fit for children.13 
When defending such free speech restrictions, the govern-
ment bears the burden of demonstrating that the indecency regu-
lations in question are sufficiently tailored to resolve conflicts 
without unnecessarily broad restrictions on speech.14  Indecency 
law stems from nuisance law in that indecency regulation seeks 
to channel material into acceptable timeframes, and not com-
pletely prohibit broadcast material.15  Therefore, the FCC has the 
burden of showing that indecency regulations are properly tai-
lored to protect children and promote diversity in the media 
without being overly broad and restraining speech in general.  
Nuisance law calls for channeling speech, not banning it alto-
gether.  However, if broadcasters are prohibited from airing cer-
tain types of diverse material during peak hours and are forced to 
air material to a significantly smaller audience or not at all, bans 
on speech may be effectuated. 
INCONSISTENT AND MISGUIDED FCC INDECENCY   
REGULATION 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandates that the 
FCC promote the public interest and diversity in the media.16  
However, the FCC’s incomplete review of broadcaster regulation 
has created arbitrary censorship of diverse broadcasting material 
without the heightened scrutiny required by law.17  Additionally, 
the FCC’s procedure of investigating and prosecuting broadcast-
ers for broadcasting indecent material has resulted in inconsistent 
enforcement of poorly reviewed regulation penalties. 
More importantly, there is an intrinsic flaw in using the pro-
tection of children as the sole justification for indecency regula-
tion.  The flaw exists in the FCC’s enforcement policy since chil-
dren are not the actual individuals reporting potential violations.  
Rather, the children’s parents, parental advisory councils and 
watchdog groups submit complaints to the FCC.  Parental advi-
sory councils and watchdog groups are problematic because they 
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often have political affiliations and partnerships with lobbyists.  
Historically, these groups have pushed for an overall clean up of 
the airwaves in the interest of the “public good”.18  Therefore, 
the original rationale of preventing harm to children has been 
morphed into campaigns for general community standards of 
morality - standards which can be arbitrary and discriminatory.  
Since the FCC conducts indecency regulation only when a 
viewer complaint is filed,19 certain groups whose sole function is 
to “patrol the airwaves” can disproportionately affect indecency 
enforcement on broadcasters.20  For example, the Parental Tele-
vision Council (“PTC”) was responsible for 99.9 % of inde-
cency complaints in 2003 and 99.8 % of indecency complaints 
in 2004 unrelated to the Super Bowl halftime show.21  The re-
sulting effect is that PTC, a Republican-driven watchdog group, 
hyper-monitors the public airwaves, which can effectively lead 
to overbroad free speech restrictions of broadcast material.22  
PTC’s founder and President, L. Brent Bozell, served as the Fi-
nance Director and President of the National Conservative Po-
litical Action Committee, furthering his political agenda. 
Not only is PTC responsible for an “overwhelming majority 
of FCC complaints,” but the number of complaints is drastically 
rising each year due to the new ability to electronically file FCC 
complaints.23  PTC regularly issues email alerts to its members 
who can easily register thousands of complaints simply by fill-
ing out an online form.24  Former Chairman Powell acknowl-
edged this complication and referred to these email complaints 
as “spam.”25  Nevertheless, PTC has had an exacting hand in 
selectively choosing broadcasters for the FCC to target and 
prosecute for allegedly indecent broadcasts.26 
Another wrinkle in the FCC’s enforcement policy is the 
more subjective second prong of indecency analysis27 which is 
measured using “contemporary community standards.”28  Theo-
retically, if the policy aims of indecency regulation were ful-
filled, this contemporary community standard should be used to 
shield children from harmful material.  The Supreme Court re-
lied on industry guidelines in Infinity Radio License, Inc. and 
held that the community standard test is “whether the material is 
patently offensive for the broadcast medium” which is gauged 
by the “average broadcast viewer or listener.”29  Determining 
what is “patently offensive” and defining who is an “average 
broadcast viewer or listener” is not only highly subjective, but 
also difficult to apply. 
A tension exists between the original policy aims of protect-
ing children and the contemporary community standards used to 
measure the protection of children.  The subjective bulk of inde-
cency analysis is guided by standards, which are supposed to be 
that of the average broadcast viewer or listener.30  But in reality, 
the aims of indecency regulation are often distorted by watchdog 
groups with socio-political agendas, capable of filing tens of 
thousands of complaints per year through their members.  FCC 
Commissioner Adlestein expounded on this inherent inconsis-
tency by stating that the “real party in interest is the Commis-
sion, acting on behalf [of] the public, rather than the specific 
individual or organization that brings allegedly indecent material 
to our attention.”31 
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF CURRENT FCC          
INDECENCY REGULATION 
Evaluating future broadcast programs for potentially inde-
cent material requires great expenditures of money and time.32  
In order for broadcasters to comply with indecency regulation as 
applied to daily programs and broadcasts, they must employ 
attorneys or specialists able to shield them from the risk of being 
fined thousands of dollars by the FCC.  Broadcasters not only 
spend vast amounts of money on attempting to ensure that their 
programs will not be arbitrarily targeted by watchdog groups, 
but also forgo broadcasting opportunities out of fear of being 
deemed non-compliant.  Given that socio-political agendas of 
watchdog groups effectively guide the FCC’s current indecency 
enforcement policy, such regulation has negatively impacted 
broadcasters. 
The standard effectuated in indecency regulation is a neo-
conservative standard that blocks out many different kinds of 
diverse media.  When special interest groups, embodying socio-
political agendas, effectively prosecute certain broadcasters or 
individuals, only material indirectly deemed acceptable by that 
group of individuals is spared from mass complaint filing and is 
permitted on the public airwaves. 
Additionally, even when individuals attempt to “break the 
surface of placidity,” the very nature and importance of the ex-
pression is often misunderstood and penalized under current 
indecency regulation.33  Artistic works that serve a political and 
social purpose among certain minority groups are habitually 
misunderstood and written off as indecent.  For example, Sarah 
Jones, a well-known female, African-American playwright, ac-
tor, poet, and activist wrote a song as a feminist critique of mi-
sogynistic lyrics in ‘gangsta rap’ entitled “Your Revolution.”34  
However, based on a single-complaint received by the FCC, her 
song was deemed to be indecent, and the radio station that aired 
the song was fined.35  In her brief on appeal filed with the FCC, 
Jones stated that “Your Revolution” was performed in high 
schools and colleges around the country and had been praised as 
a positive self-affirmation for young African-American 
women.36  Sarah Jones used her lyrics as a “free (and imagina-
tive) use of sexual language…that ma[de] the rap empower-
ing,”37 but the FCC’s indecency regulation left no room for cul-
tural context or analysis in its indecency assessment. 
Correspondingly, another example of the FCC’s failure to 
consider and value cultural context in indecency regulation was 
in the case of “The Blues” documentary, comprised of inter-
views of several blues musicians, aired by PBS and directed by 
Martin Scorsese.  Generally, broadcasters feel an artistic and 
educational integrity to retain certain material in its original 
form to accurately convey experiences of the film subjects.  
However, the FCC found “The Blues” contained indecent mate-
rial in the language used by some of the interviewees.  This con-
servative regulation effectively “paralyzed documentary film-
makers” so that filmmakers with powerful and culturally impor-
tant stories were afraid to make, tell, and air their stories on pub-
lic broadcast television.38 
For many broadcasters, there would be no difference be-
tween “Saving Private Ryan” and “The Blues” in the usage of 
certain types of language.  “Saving Private Ryan” embodies one 
of the only known exceptions to indecency analysis, in which 
the FCC ruled that the use of several expletives in the war film 
was not indecent and could exist when material was “essential to 
the nature of an artistic or educational work.”39  However, “The 
Blues”, which depicted mainly African-American musicians, 
was deemed to be indecent, while 
Saving Private Ryan which de-
picted mainly White-American 
male soldiers was not.  This deci-
sion illustrates the cultural value 
judgments reflecting a more con-
servative moral authority that 
ultimately penalized broadcasters 
of programming focused on a 
cultural minority viewpoint. 
In both of the cases listed above, Sarah Jones and “The 
Blues,” the FCC has not issued further explanatory Orders.40  
Broadcasters and certain special interest groups believe in the 
right to diverse sources of information as mandated by The 
Telecommunications Act of 199641 and the First Amendment.42  
In the minds of some, the FCC often acts as a cultural dictator, 
determining precisely what cultural mediums are appropriate 
and acceptable at any given time.43  In this way, even social 
ideas damaging to certain groups, whether they involve male/
female relations or racial dynamics, are perpetuated into law.44 
Perhaps the most famous indecent broadcast was the recent 
exposure of Janet Jackson’s breast during the Super Bowl 
XXXVIII Halftime Show on February 1, 2004.  Some analysts 
have argued that the FCC’s indecency finding based solely on 
Janet Jackson’s breast exposure, without regard to Justin Tim-
berlake’s predatory behavior or Nelly’s crotch grabbing, only 
served to perpetuate social ideas of men dominating women.45  
Timberlake was the main actor in the scene, ripping off a por-
tion of Janet Jackson’s blouse, yet he did not receive the social 
backlash and fury Janet Jackson underwent for several months, 
even years. 
Given the morally conservative broadcast climate today, 
individuals in society that have been historically marginalized, 
such as African-American women, may easily be restricted more 
frequently under current FCC indecency regulation.46  The 
FCC’s discriminatory regulations send negative messages to 
youth and to the public regarding social ideals of feminist prin-
ciples and cultural dynamics.47  It is of the utmost importance 
that the FCC not place unneces-
sarily broad restrictions on broad-
casters documenting socio-
cultural dialogs.  Current inde-
cency regulation has intimidated 
broadcasters into only broadcast-
ing material that would not likely 
cause tension with the conserva-
tive agenda of watchdog groups.  
But this is contrary to the statuto-
rily mandated aim of the FCC.  The FCC’s statutory mandate is 
to enable public access to a diverse array of media over the pub-
lic airwaves.48  Using the FCC as a puppet, political watchdog 
groups have enabled FCC commissioners to become ineffective 
“culture czars.”49 
The public, as well as broadcasters, have First Amendment 
rights to free speech guaranteed by the Constitution.  Inconsis-
tently and arbitrarily applied, current FCC indecency regulation 
has fundamentally quashed these rights.  The FCC must find a 
way to balance the public’s mandated right and interest in di-
verse forms of broadcast media with the government’s interest 
in protecting children.  Children as a group encompass individu-
als of all cultures and social classes that have the right to many 
kinds of culturally sensitive information, not just those deemed 
to be decent by neo-conservative watchdog groups.  The FCC 
has an affirmative duty to find an effective indecency regulation 
regime that precludes discriminatory consequences to minority 
groups in society. 
Spring 2007 5 
Indecency regulation exists  
to protect only one distinct group of  
people–children. Yet, currently, inde-
cency enforcement is not prosecuted on 
behalf of the interests of children.  
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I n the 1990s, in-house corporate counsel began demanding greater diversity in their outside law firms, culminating in the 1999 Morgan Letter, a diversity manifesto signed by more than 500 corporate general counsels to consider di-
versity when hiring outside counsel.2  General counsel at corpo-
rations began assessing whether women and minority lawyers 
were among the client relationship managers and their likeli-
hood to be assigned to the company’s work.3  Diversity provi-
sions, including demographic data of the law firm as well as a 
demographic breakdown of lawyers working on a company’s 
matters,4 became part of most competitive bidding for legal ser-
vices.  Later, in-house corporate counsel raised the stakes with 
the circulation of the 2004 Call to Action, which calls on in-
house corporate counsel to fire firms that lack “meaningful in-
terest in being diverse.”5  Thus far, more than 100 companies 
have signed the Call to Action.6 
In 2005, Wal-Mart shocked the legal community when it 
fired one of its outside law firms for failing to meet diversity 
goals for women and minorities.7  Looking at the sheer number 
of minority and women attorneys was not enough for Wal-Mart.  
Rather, Wal-Mart required the identification of at least one mi-
nority and one woman attorney to be among the top five rela-
tionship attorneys.8  As a result of Wal-Mart’s actions, law firms 
are finally being forced to take the Call for Action seriously. 
For women, the positive impact of these diversity initiatives 
is recognizable, but slow.  In 1995, 14.2% of equity partners 
were women, in comparison with 17.2% in 2005.9  Based on 
current rates, it will take until 2115 to reach equal numbers of 
male and female partners.10  The future for minority11 women 
looks even more dismal; they represent just 1.48% of all equity 
partners.12  The numbers for minority women partners seem 
unlikely to rise, as the attrition rate for minority female associ-
ates has risen from 75% in the late 1990s to 86% in 2005, de-
spite these diversity initiatives.13 
Well-intentioned diversity initiatives based on the generic 
advancement of “minorities and women,” however, may not 
produce a complete picture of diversity.  By only targeting 
“minorities and women,” law firms’ diversity initiatives do not 
account for the vulnerable position of minority women attorneys 
as double minorities, nor do they account for unequal advance-
ment of ethnic or racial groups, such as Asian American ad-
vancement over Latino or African American advancement.14  
This article seeks to address the precarious status of minority 
women attorneys, who are particularly susceptible to being left 
behind in diversity initiatives.  First, this article discusses the 
unequal treatment of women in the legal profession and the in-
stitutional barriers to advancement that all women face.  Second, 
this article demonstrates how the combined effect of racial bias, 
racial hierarchies, and gender bias disparately impact minority 
women within the current promotion paradigm.  Third, this arti-
cle analyzes how well-intentioned statistics-based law firm di-
versity initiatives entrench the existing two strikes against mi-
nority women while valuing female attorneys less than their 
male counterparts.  Finally, this article proposes new ways to 
assess law firm diversity. 
STRIKE ONE: PRE-EXISTING GENDER STEREOTYPING, 
COGNITIVE BIAS, AND LACK OF CHOICE FOR WOMEN IN 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION  
The passage of Title VII in 1964, which prompted the 
American Association of Law Schools and the American Bar 
Association’s adoption of equal opportunity policies for women 
in the early 1970s, coupled with the subsequent explosion of 
women law students in the 1970s and 1980s, flooded the market 
with woman attorneys.15  Although government and legal aid 
jobs were generally available to women attorneys, private law 
firms often refused to interview qualified women attorneys or 
offered lower salaries for positions with no promotion opportu-
nities.16  One woman who graduated from law school in the 
1970s recounted that she was hired because “they just thought it 
was time to have a woman, but not that work would be assigned 
to [her].”17  Once admitted, women were stereotyped by law 
firms into specialties considered appropriate for women, includ-
ing “library work and research, brief writing, ‘blue sky’ work, 
and the specialties of trusts, estates, wills, and domestic rela-
tions.”18  Because of the nature of these specialties, women flew 
under the clients’ radars.  Law firms justified this conduct by 
asserting that women “self-selected” these specialties, indicating 
their preference for that type of work.19  Women accepted work 
in these “appropriate” practice areas to gain acceptance within 
the law firm and to avoid antagonizing male lawyers, thereby 
sacrificing new client development, limiting existing client net-
working, and limiting development of legal skills in more pres-
tigious practices in exchange.20  Partnership selection relies 
heavily on inheriting an outgoing partner’s clients and subjec-
tive assessments of client recruitment and networking.21  Rather 
than acknowledging the structural odds stacked against women, 
law firms reason that women “self-select” into “of counsel” po-
sitions or non-partner track careers to accommodate family or 
work-life balance and avoid the work of client recruitment and 
development.22 
“Self-selection,” however, does not explain the dispropor-
tionate numbers of women attorneys denied partnership, with 
women attorneys accounting for 48% of all associates but only 
17.2% of equity partners.23  Rather, discriminatory evaluations, 
assignments of less important work, presumptions of incompe-
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tence, inadequate mentoring, and sexual personality stereotyping 
plague women in private law firms.24  For example, in Ezold v. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, the law firm began with a 
presumption of incompetence by telling Ezold during her inter-
view that she would have a difficult time because “she was a 
woman, had not attended an Ivy League law school, and had not 
been on law review.”25  Once hired, the firm assigned Ezold to 
“small” actions in comparison to their standard cases.  When 
later assigned to large, complex cases, the law firm rated her 
poorly for her analytical skills.26  Finally, the law firm denied 
her partnership, citing her poor analytical skills, while advanc-
ing men who scored lower in the overall partnership evalua-
tion.27 
Partnership decisions may also be influenced by implicit 
gender stereotyping or cognitive bias.28  Cognitive bias is the 
unconscious interjection of gender expectations into decision 
making, including partnership review.  For example, in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Price Waterhouse did not refute expert 
testimony that the partnership selection process was likely influ-
enced by sex stereotyping.29  Hopkins was described both as 
being “extremely competent” and “forthright” as well as abra-
sive and “overcompensating for being a woman.”  As a solution 
to aggressive interpersonal skills, one partner recommended 
Hopkins be more “feminine.”30 
Even though Title VII failed to provide a remedy for Hop-
kins and Ezold, women have used it with limited success as a 
remedy for discrimination on the basis of gender in partnership 
decisions at other private firms.31  Nevertheless, scholars criti-
cize Title VII for the heavy evidentiary burden placed on plain-
tiffs and deference to the subjective partnership decision making 
process.32  Under the current McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting 
framework, a woman attorney must establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination by demonstrating: (1) that she belongs to a 
protected class under Title VII, or that she is a woman; (2) that 
the law firm was seeking partners, that she sought partnership, 
and that she was qualified for partnership; (3) that despite her 
qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that after her rejection, 
the law firm continued to seek similarly qualified associates for 
partnership.33  Once she meets this burden, the law firm must 
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the attor-
ney’s rejection from partnership.34  The highly subjective nature 
of partnership decisions and mixed motives for denying partner-
ship make it easier to mask unconscious biases.35  Once the law 
firm articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, the woman attorney 
has the “opportunity” to show that the stated reason is a pretext, 
but must demonstrate pretext with evidence of overt discrimina-
tion.36  Once again, the subtle nature of unconscious bias creates 
a nearly insurmountable barrier to a successful remedy under 
Title VII. 
 
 
 
 
STRIKE TWO: PRE-EXISTING RACIAL STEREOTYPING, 
RACIAL HIERARCHY, AND LACK OF CHOICE FOR 
WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION  
Along with the explosion of women in law schools and law 
firms in the 1970s and 1980s came an increase of minority 
women in the legal profession.  Upon graduating, minority 
women became over-represented in public defender positions or 
in other government jobs and often took on work helping mi-
norities.37  As with white women, private law firms often re-
fused to interview qualified minority women attorneys or of-
fered lower salaries for positions with no promotion opportuni-
ties.38  To the extent that private law firms targeted minority 
women in their hiring, the underlying motivation was sometimes 
to satisfy both race and sex requirements for the price of one, or, 
if they were “lucky,” a black Latina attorney was three for the 
price of one.39  Once admitted to private law firms, minority 
women were “ghettoized”40 into certain practice areas much like 
their white counterparts.41  However, minority women attorneys 
further suffered under overt tokenism, as representatives of their 
gender and minority groups.42  One minority woman recalled 
that she “was always asked to attend functions and award cere-
monies, speak to law students of color and pose for advertising 
publications.  However, [she] never had contact with partners in 
power other than at these events.”43 
Additionally, minority women often met with clients only 
when their gender or race was an advantage – as when the client 
requests a diverse legal team or a partner assumes that minority 
clients want to see a “familiar face.”44  In a recent incident, a 
Korean-American woman in her fourth year as an associate dis-
cussed how these assumptions can backfire: 
[A managing partner] introduced me to the 
client who was Korean and he tells him that 
I’m Korean, too.  He said, “She eats kim 
chee, just like you.”  He said to me, “Talk to 
him.”  I looked at the client and said, “It’s a 
pleasure to meet you.  I’m sure you speak 
English better than I speak Korean.”  The 
client’s face was so red.  Then the partner left 
a message on my internal message system, 
and he was speaking gibberish, trying to 
sound like an Asian speaker.45 
Not only did this incident reinforce race matching, but 
it also implicitly marked the Korean-American woman 
as a Korean hostess to the Korean client, rather than 
establishing the woman as the client’s attorney. 
In addition to cognitive bias against women, minority 
women may also suffer under unconscious racism.46  For exam-
ple, minority women attorneys are often mistaken for secretar-
ies, court reporters, or paralegals.47  The disparate impact of the 
“double negative” of being a woman and a minority is evident – 
nearly two-thirds of minority women attorneys compared to 4% 
of white men were excluded from networking opportunities; 
44% of minority women compared to 2% of white men were 
denied desirable assignments; 43% of minority women com-
pared to 3% of white men were limited from client development 
opportunities; nearly one-third of minority women compared to 
less than 1% of white men felt they received unfair performance 
evaluations;48 and 20% of minority women compared to 1% of 
white men felt they were denied promotions.49  It is important to 
note that the “careers of white women attorneys and men attor-
neys of color were neither as disadvantaged as those of women 
attorneys of color.”50  All of these biases culminate in the dispar-
ity of retention rates in law firms for minority women at 53% 
compared to 72% for white men.51  However, while white men 
often left to go to other large law firms, many minority women 
left for smaller or minority-owned law firms, accounting for the 
estimated 86% attrition rate for minority women.52 
Often overlooked is the nuanced difference between stereo-
types of particular groups of minority women and their effects 
on women lawyers.53  Asian-American women attorneys may be 
stereotyped as “hard-working, obedient, and compliant (a racial-
ized and gendered stereotype), but also as sexually available in a 
particularly racialized way.”54  Additionally, Asian-American 
women attorneys may be seen as too passive for litigation or 
other “bet the firm” type of work.55  Interestingly, the very traits 
lacking in so-called passive and obedient Asian-American 
women attorneys are considered detrimental for so-called ag-
gressive and combative African-American women attorneys, 
who are also considered “sexually available” and sexualized as 
“deceitful and promiscuous.”56  African-American women attor-
neys are particularly susceptible to having their attorney status 
overlooked and mistaken as support staff.57  Latina attorneys 
may be questioned about their immigration status or stereotyped 
as speaking Spanish.58  Additionally, they may often be chan-
neled into immigration work under the assumption that they 
would have a vested interest.59  Finally, Arab-American women 
attorneys may be stereotyped as oppressed by their veils or as 
“passive victim[s] of Arab patriarchy.”60  Although not exhaus-
tive, these stereotypes demonstrate both overt and unconscious 
biases confronting minority women in the legal field. 
These racial biases are compounded by a hierarchy in white 
America’s prejudice and stereotyping toward different racial 
groups – with African Americans at the very bottom of the ra-
cial hierarchy, followed by Latinos, and with Asian Americans 
often scoring positively.61  Social stereotyping often manifests 
itself in hiring and partnership decisions in private law firms.62  
For example, although Asian Americans accounted for 11.3% 
of the top 20 law school graduates in 2005, they accounted for 
15% of large law firm associates.63  Compare this to African 
Americans accounting for 7.4% of law school graduates and 
just 5% of associates, as well as Latinos accounting for 6.9% of 
law school graduates and just 4.7% of associates.64  Between 
1998 and 2005, the growth of Asian-American attorneys (nearly 
doubling from 8.7% to 15%) at large law firms dwarfed the 
growth of African-American attorneys (marginally growing 
from 4% to 5%) and Latino attorneys (marginally growing from 
3.7% to 4.7%), suggesting that societal racial hierarchies trans-
late to private law firms.65  However, once allowed to move up 
the power structure, it seems that all minorities are left out, with 
Asian Americans as 11.8% of the pre-partner pool and 3.7% of 
the new partners; African Americans as 4.2% of the pre-partner 
poll and 1.2% of the new partners; and Latinos as 2.9% of the 
pre-partner pool and 1.6% of the new partners.66  The gender 
and racial hierarchies represented in the studies were also evi-
dent in Jenner & Block LLP’s summer associate class, which 
was the largest reported summer associate class in 2001 - there 
were 90 white summer associates (61 men and 29 women), 10 
Asian-American summer associates (6 men and 4 women), 4 
Latino summer associates (2 men and 2 women), and 1 African-
American summer associate (0 men and 1 woman).67  Conse-
quently, minority women are subject to three levels of subjuga-
tion in preference: first, subjugated as women; second, subju-
gated as minorities; and third, subjugated within their own mi-
nority status. 
While Title VII provides an available remedy for discrimi-
nation against minority women, the burden-shifting framework 
presents some practical difficulties for proving discrimination 
based on the intersection of gender and race.68  First, there are 
no cases to date challenging a partnership decision in the legal 
profession on the basis of gender plus race, perhaps for the very 
reason that Title VII is not an effective remedy for minority 
women.  The current framework for challenging partnership 
decisions may require that a woman choose to litigate as a 
woman or as a minority, but not as both.69  Thus, minority 
women risk the catch-22 of courts bifurcating their female self 
from their minority self, finding that separately they have not 
been discriminated against as a woman or as a minority, and 
ignoring that the permutation of both was the basis of their dis-
crimination.70 
There are, however, a growing number of cases recognizing 
intersectionality of protected classes under Title VII.71  The 
Fifth Circuit found that African-American women constituted a 
separate protected class under Title VII in Jeffries v. Harris 
County Community Action Ass’n.72  Additionally, the Ninth 
Circuit found in Lam v. University of Hawaii that treating race 
and gender discrimination separately did not adequately assess 
the form of discrimination leveled against an Asian-American 
woman.73  In particular, the Ninth Circuit found that Asian-
American women experience a different set of stereotypes than 
do Asian-American men and white women.74  However, even 
after proving all of the elements of prima facie discrimination, a 
minority woman attorney may have difficulty demonstrating the 
nuanced discrimination faced by her sub-class in proving pre-
text for denial of partnership.  Moreover, the relatively small 
numbers of women and minorities in private law firms makes it 
difficult to find an appropriate “similarly situated” attorney for 
comparison.  In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, the court used 
intersectionality of protected classes against an African-
American woman, holding that she was not similar enough to 
all women to be certified as a class representative.75  Addition-
ally, there were no “statistically significant” numbers of Afri-
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can-American women employed by the defendant company, 
barring her from bringing a claim as an African-American 
woman.76  Given that the Moore court found that an African-
American woman was significantly different than white women 
and African-American men, should Arab-American women be 
compared with Arab-American men, other minority women in 
general, or white women?77  In law firms, finding an appropri-
ate “similarly-situated” person is complicated further by the 
small numbers of other minorities available for comparison.   
STRIKE THREE: THE NEW DIVERSITY MARKET, MARKET 
DYSFUNCTION, AND DIVERSITY QUEUES 
The lack of an effective remedy under Title VII, the mas-
sive attrition rates for minority women in large law firms, and 
the lack of law firm commitment to diversity drove the rapidly 
diversifying general counsel of corporations to take action.  The 
Morgan Letter and the Call to Action brought forth a flood of 
diversity initiatives based on the number of minorities and 
women in law firms, creating a new market for diversity.78  Top 
law students also prioritize diversity when conducting job 
searches, forcing law firms to at least address the issue to attract 
the most qualified candidates.79  In June 2005, Wal-Mart sent a 
letter to its 100 largest outside counsel requesting a list of three 
to five potential partners who would manage the case with the 
general counsel, requiring at least one minority and one 
woman.80  Oracle asked “that the first person [a law firm] con-
sider for assignment to the case be a woman or a minority em-
ployee of your firm with appropriate experience.”81  Large cor-
porations, including Dupont and General Motors, track and 
monitor the number of hours worked by minority and women 
lawyers on their matters by their outside law firms.82  Large cor-
porations also require demographic breakdowns of minority and 
women associates and partners.83 
Corporate counsel diversity initiatives may not actually 
generate change in private law firms, however.  First, law firms 
may be resistant to change or do not have effective diversity 
policies.84  Some law firms have responded to diversity initia-
tives by substituting exclusionary discrimination of women and 
minority attorneys with tokenism and “mascoting,” reminiscent 
of law firms’ reactions to the affirmative action policies of the 
1970s.85  Furthermore, law firms such as Venable LLP, Womble 
Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP, and Sonnenschein Nath & 
Rosenthal LLP have circumvented actual change in their part-
nership structure by forming alliances with minority-owned law 
firms.86  Although their motive may not have been to circumvent 
change, these alliances were prompted by a lack of qualified 
minorities and women in their firms.87  Not only does this allow 
big firms to “outsource” diversity, but it denies their own minor-
ity and women attorneys the opportunity to pursue these cases.88 
Additionally, diversity initiatives may actually entrench 
minority stereotypes.  A danger implicit in diversity initiatives is 
a tendency to assume clients of a particular racial background 
prefer to work with attorneys of the same background or for 
clients to request an attorney of a particular background.89  By 
demanding diversity, general counsel may be intentionally or 
unintentionally calling for race or gender matching.90  This rein-
forces race and gender essentialism and assumes that an Afri-
can-American male client prefers an African-American male 
attorney or that an Asian-American woman client prefers an 
Asian-American female attorney.91  “Race matching” by private 
law firms, however, is prohibited under Title VII.  For example, 
although employers may engage in affirmative action to remedy 
past discrimination, basing job assignments on racial stereotypes 
violates Title VII.92 
Furthermore, if assigned to a case by virtue of race, gender, 
or a combination of both, minority and women attorneys may 
not be able to turn down assignments without detrimentally im-
pacting their partnership opportunities.  For example, in King v. 
Phelps Dunbar, an African-American male attorney claimed 
that partners at the firm withheld work and unfairly criticized his 
work after turning down assignments made because of his 
race.93  Additionally, King refused to return to a trial after the 
opposing counsel made a racially insensitive remark.94  Al-
though it was undisputed that King’s evaluations were positive 
prior to these incidents and sharply declined until his resignation 
several years later, the court found that King lacked evidence 
tying the critical evaluations to these incidents.95  Consequently, 
when diversity initiatives prompt “race matching,” minorities 
may not realistically be able to turn down an assignment.  This 
has implications for career development for minorities who may 
have an interest in particular practice areas, but are channeled 
into work where a particular client wants a minority.  The rela-
tively small number of minorities in law firms greatly increases 
the likelihood of this phenomenon.  For example, in the Jenner 
& Block LLP example, if a client had requested that an African-
American summer associate work on his case, only one summer 
associate would qualify, forcing her to take the case. 
Finally, numbers-based diversity initiatives put a stigma on 
women and minorities as “affirmative action hires.”96  Attorneys 
hired to meet general counsel diversity standards may lead to the 
dominant white male partners further questioning their abilities 
and qualifications.97  For example, preferences for hiring Afri-
can Americans may be viewed as counterproductive in large law 
firms and as evidence that African Americans are not as quali-
fied as their white counterparts.98  This is the same type of ra-
tionale used in discussing why minorities leave large law firms 
in droves.99 
Even if private law firms do not side-step changes in their 
diversity initiatives, the “minorities and women” standard set 
forth by the general counsel may entrench the existing margin-
alization of minority women.  Continued use of a vague 
“minority and women” category may allow law firms to hide 
behind their existing diversity marketing.  For example, a survey 
of the top ten ranked law firms, ranked by associate satisfaction, 
diversity, hours, pay, associate/partner relations, formal and in-
formal training, and pro bono commitment,100  demonstrates that 
even the best law firms utilize the generic diversity standard of 
“women and minorities” on their recruitment websites.  The 
“women and minorities” standard is evidenced in diversity ini-
tiatives that boast of recruitment of “25% persons of color”101 to 
“hosting diversity events”102 to “diversity scholars programs.”103  
Some tout advancement of women attorneys, but reviewing the 
ethnic and racial backgrounds of their female partners reveals 
that advancement of women attorneys really means advance-
ment of white women attorneys.104  When firms list their diver-
sity statistics on their recruitment websites, they generally do 
not provide a breakdown of minority women and minority men. 
105  However, a review of the gender of their minority partners 
reveals advancement of minority 
male attorneys, rather than mi-
nority women attorneys.106 Ad-
ditionally, most of the law firms’ 
recruitment websites clumped 
the diversity statistics for all 
their offices together, rather than 
providing an office-by-office 
breakdown.  Others did not 
make mention of diversity pro-
grams at all.107  These were just a few of the generalized images 
of diversity presented by the top ten law firms, none of which 
provided a clear picture of the actual diversity of their law firm. 
Minority women may also be denied access to the prestig-
ious large corporate cases because of their current position 
within the “diversity queue.”108  Barbara Reskin and Patricia 
Roos discuss job queues as the ordering of a group of employees 
in the order of preference, where employers will choose the em-
ployee in the highest position on the job queue as possible.  His-
torically, employers created “gender queues” in their hiring 
practices, hiring men before women.109  An updated version of 
the “gender queue” would be the “diversity queue,” or the rank-
ing of minorities and women in the order of most preferred to 
least preferred.  Thus, female attorneys are not only valued less 
than male attorneys, but they are also placed lower in the job 
queue by virtue of being assigned less important work and pre-
sumed to be incompetent. Additionally, the existence of a racial 
hierarchy caused by cognitive bias and stereotyping, may ele-
vate Asian Americans over Latinos and African Americans in 
the job queue.  Therefore, minority women may be lowered 
within the job queue by virtue of being a woman and a minority. 
Although this phenomenon has not been studied before, the 
current composition of law firm diversity, especially among the 
partners of law firms, supports the hypothesis that minority men 
and white women are more successful in their law firm careers 
than minority women.110  It is worth noting that minority male 
partners outnumber their female counterparts more than two to 
one, despite the fact there are more minority woman associates 
than minority male associates.111  For example, using Jenner & 
Block LLP’s 2001 summer associate class composition reflect-
ing 111 attorneys, a requirement of assigning a minority or 
woman attorney to a particular case could create a queue with 
44 eligible attorneys to fulfill the diversity requirement - 29 
white women, eight minority men, and seven minority 
women.112  If the diversity queue really does exist, the odds are 
stacked against the seven minority women at the bottom of the 
queue.  Although there is no direct evidence of a diversity 
queue, the current composition of law firms certainly implies 
there could be, and that it would be worth further inquiry in the 
future. 
MAKING IT TO HOME: THE FINAL SCORE 
Current diversity initiatives, while well-intentioned, are 
fraught with loopholes and problems such as the lack of a uni-
form diversity amongst general 
counsel, implicit race matching, 
and lack of transparency in diver-
sity programs at the law firms.  
Moreover, the new push by cor-
porate general counsel for in-
creasing the numbers of women 
and minorities will simply en-
trench the current problems, re-
sulting in the continued margin-
alization of minority women.  By targeting only “minorities and 
women,” diversity initiatives do not account for the vulnerable 
position of minority women attorneys as double minorities, nor 
do they account for unequal advancement of ethnic or racial 
groups, such as Asian American advancement over Latino or 
African American advancement, within law firms.113 
Uniform diversity standards should replace the haphazard 
diversity reporting requirements established by corporate gen-
eral counsel for their outside law firms.  Instead, an ABA diver-
sity certification program for law firms could create one uniform 
standard and yearly renewal and oversight over law firm diver-
sity initiatives.114  Currently, the ABA offers Continuing Legal 
Education (CLE) courses on diversity and has the institutional 
knowledge from its comprehensive reports on diversity.115  The 
ABA has already worked in conjunction with corporate general 
counsel to discuss diversity strategies and could continue to do 
so in creating a new diversity certification program.116  Although 
these types of programs have always been voluntary, corporate 
general counsel could agree to only use and retain law firms 
who are certified by the ABA as meeting their diversity require-
ments.  Therefore, while diversity certification would not be 
mandatory, the corporate signatories to the “Call to Action” 
could simply consult the ABA to verify law firms in compliance 
with their diversity objectives, creating a business case for law 
firms to obtain their diversity certification. 
Additionally, general counsel should stop utilizing diversity 
quotas, which could serve to perpetuate “affirmative action bias” 
and disproportionately disenfranchise minority women attor-
neys.  Rather than focusing on statistics, which tends to promote 
race or gender matching, a diversity certification program could 
provide measures resolving or redressing institutional biases 
against women, minorities, and minority women.  For example, 
the ABA certification program could require equity partners to 
attend a certain number of diversity CLEs as part of their certifi-
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cation requirements.117  Consequently, for law firms whose cli-
ents are part of the “Call to Action,” this would create a business 
case for attendance in order to secure the ABA diversity certifi-
cation and retain their client’s work.  Additionally, diversity 
inclusiveness and environment could be assessed through yearly 
surveys of each law firm’s associates and partners, with reports 
generated back to each law firm to identify particular areas of 
concern.  The ABA already has the resources to put together an 
effective questionnaire and could include factors such as associ-
ate/partner relations, experiences of discrimination, availability 
of work, and others.118  To allow for personalized diversity pro-
grams within each law firm, renewal of certification could be 
tied to closing the gap between associate and partner perceptions 
of work environment.  Although numbers may be important to 
assess the medium and long term success rates of diversity certi-
fication, they should not be the primary focus as they are now. 
Each law firm’s diversity statistics at the associate and part-
ner level should be made publicly available through the ABA, 
with the breakdown of women (and each sub-category of mi-
norities) and men (and each sub-category of minorities) to avoid 
the double counting of minority status as well as identify the 
advancement of each particular minority group.  Furthermore, 
the ABA could follow the National Association for Legal Pro-
fessionals example of reporting by office to avoid double count-
ing or blurring the numbers of one firm across several offices 
which could mask diversity problems one particular branch of-
fice.119  The availability of detailed statistics will force law firms 
to deal with the realities of their numbers rather than hiding be-
hind idyllic diversity brochures and allow prospective employ-
ees to assess the environment of the law firm independently. 
Finally, partnership requirements should be more transpar-
ent, with clear requirements and benchmarks for associates to 
rely on in their career development.  The subjective nature of 
partnership decisions makes it difficult for women and minority 
associates to determine and prove the reason for failing to make 
partner, since law firms can easily point to other motives.120  
Transparency would help relieve the evidentiary burden on mi-
nority attorneys making claims under Title VII and help make 
Title VII a more effective remedy. 
The future success of diversity initiatives promulgated by 
corporate general counsel will depend on their ability to coordi-
nate with each other to leverage their influence to make the busi-
ness case for diversity in law firms.  Law firms must feel the 
financial impact of not meeting diversity standards.  In particu-
lar, this will require more corporations to act like Wal-Mart has 
done and fire law firms that do not meet their diversity goals.  
By making the bottom line money and shifting the focus from 
merely increasing the number of women and minorities to evalu-
ating a firm’s environment of inclusiveness, senior equity part-
ners will be more likely to commit to diversity. 
ENDNOTES 
* LeeAnn O’Neill is a third-year law student at American University Washington 
College of Law and is the former Editor-in-Chief of The Modern American.  She 
earned her B.A. from the George Washington University.   
 
1 Learning to Give, available at http://www.learningtogive.org/search/quotes/
Display_Quotes.asp?subject_id=113&search_type=subject (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
2 Jeremy Fieler, Law Firm Diversity gets Closer Scrutiny,  PHIL. BUS. J. (May 20, 
2002), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2002/05/20/
story5.html?t=printable (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); Jill Nawrocki, GCs Put on the 
Pressure, MINORITY L.J. (May 1, 2006), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
mlj/diversityScorecard.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Nawrocki]. 
3 Nawrocki, supra note 2; Raymond L. Ocampo, Jr., On Hiring Women and Mi-
nority Attorneys: One General Counsel’s Perspective, FindLaw.com, available at 
http://careers.findlaw.com/diversity/articles/onhiring.html (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
4 Fieler, supra note 2. 
5 Rick Palmore, Call to Action: Diversity in the Legal Profession, available at 
http://www.acca.com/resource/getfile.php?id=5748 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
6 Minority Corporate Counsel Association, Call to Action Corporate Signatories: 
Diversity in the Legal Profession, available at http://www.mcca.com/CTA/
signatories-print.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (including companies like Coca-
Cola, Wal-Mart, and Microsoft). 
7 Edgardo Ramos and Lynn Anne Baronas, What Works: Ways to Increase Diver-
sity at Law Firms, 1/16/2006 NAT’L L.J. 13. 
8 Meredith Hobbs, Wal-Mart Demands Diversity in Law Firms, Law.com (July 6, 
2005), available at www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?
id=1120579809481 (last visited March 7, 2007). 
9 WOMEN’S BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CREATING PATH-
WAYS TO SUCCESS: ADVANCING AND RETAINING WOMEN IN TODAY’S LAW 
FIRMS at 11 (May 2006), available at http://www.wbadc.org/associations/1556/
files/Creating%20Pathways%20Report%20PDF.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) 
[hereinafter Pathways to Success]. 
10 Id. 
11 This article uses “minority” or the phrase “of color” as an umbrella term for 
persons of Latina, African-American, American Indian, Asian-American, Arab-
American, and multiracial descent.  Due to a lack of information on the impact of 
diversity initiatives on lesbian women or other women who could be considered 
diverse (e.g. handicapped, deaf, etc.), this article focuses solely on diversity in a 
racial context. 
12 National Association of Legal Professionals, Percentage of Women and Minori-
ties at Law Firms Up Slightly in 2006; Only 1.48% of Partners are Minority 
Women, available at http://nalp.org/content/index.php?pid=448 (last visited Mar. 
7, 2007). 
13 ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS at 9 (2006), 
[hereinafter ABA Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/women/
VisibleInvisibility-ExecSummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); see also CATA-
LYST, WOMEN IN LAW: MAKING THE CASE (2001) [hereinafter Catalyst Report], 
available at http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/titles/title.php?
page=lead_wlmkcase_01 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (noting  
similar phenomenon from the 1970s to the 1990s). 
14 See Emily Barker, Not all Diversity is Created Equal, MINORITY L.J. (Summer 
2005), available at http://www.townsend.com/files/Diversity%206%20page.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (discussing that the strong showing of Asian Ameri-
cans at private law firms masks the lack of hiring and retention of African Ameri-
cans and Latinos); ABA Multicultural Women Attorneys Network, American Bar 
Association, The Burdens of Both, the Privileges of Neither - Summary, available 
at http://www.abanet.org/abastore/index.cfm?
section=main&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=4520003 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2007) (identifying that the combination of being an attorney of color and a 
woman is a double negative). 
15 Nancy Farrer, Of Ivory Columns and Glass Ceilings: The Impact of the Su-
preme Court of the United States on the Practice of Women Attorneys in Law 
Firms, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 529, 542-43 (1997). 
16 Id. at 547-49; Paula Patton, Women Lawyers, Their Status, Influence, and Re-
tention in the Legal Profession, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 174, 184-85 
(2004); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, DIVERSITY IN 
LAW FIRMS at 2, (2003) [hereinafter Diversity in Law Firms]. 
17 Catalyst Report, supra note 13, at 30. 
18 Farrer, supra note 15, at 552; HEDDA GARZA, BARRED FROM THE BAR 185 
(1996). 
19 CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 107-08 (2d ed. 1993); but see 
Nachum Sicherman, Gender Differences in Departures from a Large Firm, 49 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 484, 500 (1996); see generally Mary Becker, Barriers 
Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional Reme-
dies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1986); Jane 
Friesen, Alternative Economic Perspectives on the Use of Labor Market Policies 
to Redress the Gender Gap in Compensation, 82 Geo. L. J. 31 (1994). 
20 FUCHS EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 109; see generally Patton, supra note 16. 
21 Eunice Chwenyen Peters, Making it to the Brochure but not to Partnership, 45 
WASHBURN L.J. 625, 642-43 (2006). 
22 See generally Patton, supra note 16; WARREN FARRELL, WHY MEN EARN 
MORE (2005); Michael Carter and Susan Boslego Carter, Women’s Recent Pro-
gress in the Professions or, Women Get a Ticket to Ride after the Gravy Train 
Has Left the Station, 7 FEM. STUD. 477 (Fall 1981); Elizabeth Chambliss, Or-
ganizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 669 
(1997). 
23 Pathways to Success, supra note 9. 
24 Farrer, supra note 15, at 556-57; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989); see also Neuren v. Adduci, 43 F.3d 1507 (D.C. Cir 1995). 
25 Ezold v. Wolf, 983 F.2d 509, 514 (3d Cir. 1992). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Charles Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Proc-
ess of Intergroup Bias, 59 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 475 (1990); See generally 
Adam J. Oliner, The Cognitive Roots of Stereotyping, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (2000), available at http://adam.oliner.net/comp/stereotyping.html 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
29 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Dow v. Donovan, 
150 F.Supp.2d 249 (D. Mass. 2001); Masterson v. LaBrum, 846 F.Supp. 1224 
(E.D. Penn. 1993). 
32 See Chwenyen Peters, supra note 21, at 639; Martin Katz, The Fundamental 
Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment 
Law, 94 GEORGETOWN L.J. 489 (2006); Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. 
Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common Law Outlook on a Statu-
tory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 66 (1990); see also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society 
in Tradition II: Price Waterhouse and the Individual Employment Discrimina-
tion Case, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 1042–44 (1990).  
33 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
34 Id. 
35 See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.  
36 See generally Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
37 See GARZA, supra note 18, at 171; Catalyst Report, supra note 13, at 59; 
Elizabeth Chambliss, Miles to Go 2000: Progress of Minorities in the Legal 
Profession - Summary, ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the 
Profession (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/minorities/publications/
milestogo.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); Diversity in Law Firms, supra note 16. 
38 Farrer, supra note 15, at 547-49; Patton, supra note 16, at 185 (2004); See also 
GARZA, supra note 18, at 171-176. 
39 GARZA, supra note 18, at 171-176; see also Jesse B. Semple, Invisible Man: 
Black and Male Under Title VII, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 749, 759-760 (1991); George 
La Noue, Standards for the Second Generation of Croson-Inspired Disparity 
Studies, 26 URB. LAW. 485 (1994). 
40 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2000), available at http://
www.bartleby.com/61/22/G0112200.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (defining 
“ghettoize” as: “To set apart in or as if in a ghetto; isolate”). 
41 The Burdens of Both, the Privileges of Neither - Summary, American Bar 
Association Web Store, available at http://www.abanet.org/abastore/index.cfm?
section=main&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=4520003 (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
42 See Martha Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield: Contemporary 
Dilemmas Facing Women Law Professors, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
195, 195 (2004) (crediting the term “tokenism” to Dr. Martin Luther King); See 
also, ANGEL KWOLEK-FOLLAND, INCORPORATING WOMEN: A HISTORY OF 
WOMEN & BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2002). 
43 Ari Shapiro, Why So Few Minority Women Stay at Law Firms, All Things 
Considered (Aug. 3, 2006), National Public Radio, available at http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5613964 (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
44 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 10. 
45 Ari Shapiro, supra note 43.   
46 See Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 343-344 (1987); David 
Amodio and Patricia Devine, Implicit Stereotyping vs. Evaluative Race Bias, 91 
J. PERS. & SOC. PSY. 652-661 (2006), available at http://www.psych.nyu.edu/
amodiolab/Amodio%20&%20Devine%20(2006).pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
47 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 10. 
48 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that unfair performance evaluations 
includes ignored accomplishments, exaggerated mistakes, and “soft” evaluations 
which made it difficult to correct mistakes). 
49 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 10; See also Catalyst Report, supra note 13, at 
29-44. 
50 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 10. 
51 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 10 
52 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 10. 
53 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (arguing that a woman’s experience cannot be 
broken down into sex, race, class, etc. separately); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demar-
ginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-
discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139; but see, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Keeping It Real: On Anti-
“Essentialism,” in WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 84, 84-90 (2005).  
54 Emily Houh, Race, Sex, and Working Identities, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 905, 
935 (2006); Lily Liu, All Asian Asians are Good at…, Diversity and the Bar 
(May 2001), Minority Corporate Council Association, available at http://
www.mcca.com/site/data/inhouse/minorityattorneys/asianamerican.htm (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2007); see also Miranda Oshige McGowen and James Lindgren, 
Testing the “Model Minority Myth,” 100 NW. U.L. REV. 331 (2006). 
55 See, e.g., Janine Robben, Elimination of Bias, Oregon State Bar Bulletin, 66-
MAR OR. ST. B. BULL. 9 (Mar. 2006), available at http://search.osbar.org/
showHTMLhits.asp?cmd=getdoc&maxSize=200000&DocId=3441&Index=C%
3a%5cProgram%20Files%5cdtSearch%20Developer%5cUserData%5cOSB%
2dFullSite%
2dHTML&HitCount=10&hits=4+406+4c7+540+727+79b+968+a27+c04+cb1+
&hc=2410&req=bulletin (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); Jill Schachner Chanen, 
Early Exits, ABA J., Aug. 2006, available at http://www.abanet.org/women/
EarlyExits.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
56 Edward W. Jones, Jr., Black Managers: The Dream Deferred, 5/1/86 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 84, 91 (1986); Schachner Chanen, supra note 54. 
57 See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Will Inquiry Produce Action? Studying Effects 
of Gender in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 643 (1998). 
58 Schachner Chanen, supra note 54; Roger Knight, National Society for His-
panic Professionals, Hispanic Stereotypes – How They Affect Us At Work? (Part 
I), (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.nshp.org/career_and_jobs/
hispanic_stereotypes_how_they_affect_us_at_work_part_i (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007); Vivirlatino, Latino Stereotypes Following Us to Work, (Aug. 29, 2006), 
available at http://vivirlatino.com/2006/08/29/latino-stereotypes-following-us-
to-work.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
59 Judy Scales-Trent, Equal Rights Advocates: Addressing the Legal Issues of 
Women of Color, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 68 (1998). 
60 Rachel Saloom, Arab Stereotyping: A Multi-disciplinary Perspective, 2 AM. 
U. MODERN AM. 24, 27-28 (Fall 2006). 
61 Jeffrey Dixon, The Ties That Bind and Those That Don’t: Toward Reconciling 
Group Threat and Contact Theories of Prejudice, 84 SOCIAL FORCES 2179, 
2187-88 (June 2006); Tom W. Smith, Ethnic Images, General Social Survey 
Project, Dec. 1990, available at http://cloud9.norc.uchicago.edu/dlib/t-19.htm 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
62 See Lawrence, supra note 46. 
63 New York City Bar, 2006 Diversity Signatory Law Firm Report (2006) at 21, 
available at http://www.abcny.org/Diversity/FirmBenchmarking06.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Benchmarking Report]. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.; see also Barker, supra note 14. 
66 Benchmarking Report, supra note 62, at 22. 
67 Mark H. Schauerte, Summer Associate Diversity Tops Other Groups at Firms, 
CHICAGO LAWYER MAGAZINE, July 2002, at 7, available at http://
www.franczek.com/the_firm/press_room/summer.html (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
68 See Harris supra note 52; Crenshaw, supra note 52. 
69 See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div, 413 F. Supp. 142, 
143 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
Spring 2007 13 
ENDNOTES CONTINUED 
14 THE MODERN AMERICAN 
ENDNOTES CONTINUED 
70 See Crenshaw, supra note 52. 
71 See generally Kathleen McKenna, Litigating Employment Discrimination & 
Sexual Harassment Claims 2006, 743 PLI/Lit 195 (June 2006). 
72 Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
73 Lam v. Univ. of Haw, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). 
74 Id. 
75 Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983). 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 There has been an explosion of Continuing Learning Education programs on 
the growing business argument for diversity and how to implement diversity 
initiatives, many with the assistance of corporate general counsel.  See, e.g., 
ABA-CLE Diversity Programming and Initiatives, Diversifying the Legal Pro-
fession: Strategies from General Counsel, available at http://www.abanet.org/
cle/clenow/diversifyingreg.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); ABA-CLE Diver-
sity Programming and Initiatives, Valuing Diversity: Law Firms and Leadership 
in the 21st Century –  Summary, available at http://www.abanet.org/abastore/
index.cfm?section=cle&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=V99VDLD (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2007). 
79 See Vault.com, Rankings Methodology for Top 100 Firms, available at http://
www.vault.com/nr/lawrankings.jsp?law2006=8&ch_id=242 (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
80 Hobbs, supra note 8. 
81 Raymond L. Ocampo, Jr., On Hiring Women and Minority Attorneys: One 
General Counsel’s Perspective, Findlaw.com, 1994, available at http://
careers.findlaw.com/diversity/articles/onhiring.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
82 Tamara Loomis, Corporate Counsel Push Law Firms to Diversify; Data 
Collected on Billable Hours for Minorities and Women, 10/25/2000 N.Y.L.J., 8 
(2000). 
83 Id.  
84 See J. Cunyon Gordon, Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have a Black 
Lawyer Sit at Our Table,” 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1291 (2003); Delyte D. 
Frost, Minority Corporate Counsel Association, Diversity Worst Practices, 
DIVERSITY & THE BAR (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.mcca.com/site/
data/corporate/BP/worstpractices0301.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); Catalyst, 
Inc., Making Change: Tackling Resistance to Diversity Efforts - Summary 
(2002), available at http://www.catalyst.org/xcart/product.php?
productid=16160 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
85 See Cunyon Gordon, supra note 82, at 1258. 
86 Dimitra Kessenides, Outsourcing Diversity?, MINORITY L.J. (May. 1, 2005), 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/mlj/PubArticleMLJ.jsp?
id=1146560724206&hubtype=Scorecard.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 See, e.g., King v. Phelps Dunbar LLP, 844 So.2d 1012 (La.App. 4th Cir. 
4/2/03). 
90 See Cunyon Gordon, supra note 82, at 1284-85. 
91 Id.   
92 See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parket Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (11th Cir 1999). 
93 King, 844 So.2d at 1014. 
94 Id. at 1021. 
95 Id. at 1023. 
96 BARBARA RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOY-
MENT 57 (1998); Madeline Heilman, Caryn Block, and Peter Stathos, The Af-
firmative Action Stigma of Incompetence: Effects of Performance Information 
Ambiguity, 40 ACADEMY OF MGMT J. 603 (1997); GREGORY NORTHCRAFT, 
THE STIGMA OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS - Summary 
(1983), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/Home.portal?
_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=RecordDetails&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED
235415&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=eric_accno&objectId=0900000b8010
00ff (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
97 Heilman, et al, supra note 94.   
98 Richard Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N. CAR. 
L. REV. 1755 (2006). 
99 Id.  
100 Vault.com, available at http://www.vault.com/nr/lawrankings.jsp?
law2004=2&ch_id=242&top100=1 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (listing the top 10 
law firms and nationally ranking them by weighing scores – 40% satisfaction, 
10% percent hours, 10% pay, 10% associate/partner relations, 10% diversity 
(women, minorities and gays), 10% formal training, 5% informal training, 5% 
pro bono). 
101 See, e.g., Wachtell, Litpon, Rosen & Katz, available at  
http://www.wlrk.com/Page.cfm/Thread/The%20Firm/SubThread/Diversity  
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
102 See, e.g., Cravath, Swaine & Moore, available at http://www.cravath.com/
Cravath.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
103 See, e.g., Latham & Watkins, available at http://www.lw.com/recruiting/
diversity.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
104 See, e.g., Sullivan & Cromwell, available at http://www.sullcrom.com/
careers/legalrecruiting/womenpartners/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
105 See e.g., Davis, Polk, & Wardwell, available at http://www.dpw.com/
careers/racial.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, 
available at http://www.stblaw.com/div_diversity.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., Cleary Gottlieb, available at http://www.cgsh.com (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2007). 
108 I have coined this term drawing from the discussion of “gender queues.”  See 
generally BARBARA RESKIN AND PATRICIA ROOS, JOB QUEUES, GENDER 
QUEUES: EXPLAINING WOMEN’S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS (1999). 
109 Id.  
110 See, e.g., Sullivan & Cromwell, available at http://www.sullcrom.com/
careers/legalrecruiting/womenpartners/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (where all 
female partners featured on their diversity recruiting website were white fe-
males); see generally the websites of Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, Cravath 
Swaine & Moore, Skadden Arps, Davis Polk, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, 
Latham & Watkins, Cleary Gottlieb, Weil Gotshal, and Covington & Burling; 
National Association of Legal Professionals, Percentage of Women and Minori-
ties at Law Firms Up Slightly in 2006, available at http://nalp.org/content/
index.php?pid=448 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (reporting that women represent 
17.9% of partners, minorities 5%, minority women 1.48%, and minority men 
3.52%). 
111 National Association of Legal Professionals, supra note 107. 
112 Schauerte, supra note 66. 
113 See Barker, supra note 14. 
114 See Chwenyen Peters, supra note 21. 
115 See, e.g., ABA-CLE Diversity Programming and Initiatives, Diversifying the 
Legal Profession: Strategies from General Counsel, available at http://
www.abanet.org/cle/clenow/diversifyingreg.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); 
ABA-CLE Diversity Programming and Initiatives, Valuing Diversity: Law 
Firms and Leadership in the 21st Century –  Summary, available at http://
www.abanet.org/abastore/index.cfm?
section=cle&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=V99VDLD (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007); ABA Report, supra note 13. 
116 See ABA-CLE Diversity Programming and Initiatives, Diversifying the 
Legal Profession: Strategies from General Counsel, available at http://
www.abanet.org/cle/clenow/diversifyingreg.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); 
ABA-CLE Diversity Programming and Initiatives, Valuing Diversity: Law 
Firms and Leadership in the 21st Century –  Summary, available at http://
www.abanet.org/abastore/index.cfm?
section=cle&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=V99VDLD (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007); ABA Report, supra note 13. 
117 See Chwenyen Peters, supra note 21. 
118 A more concise form of the questionnaire used for the ABA Report or the 
Catalyst Report could be utilized.  ABA Report, supra note 13; Catalyst Report, 
supra note 13. 
119 National Association of Legal Professionals, Women and Attorneys of Color 
at Law Firms (2004), available at http://www.nalp.org/content/index.php?
pid=152 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
120 Chwenyen Peters, supra note 21, at 643; Ezold, 983 F.2d 509. 
 
Spring 2007 15 
PLEASE DON’T FEED THE HOMELESS: POTTINGER REVISITED 
 
By Shirley D. Howell* 
I n 1988, Miami’s homeless population filed a class action, Pottinger v. City of Miami,2 alleging that city officials acted in concert to deprive them of their civil rights.  While the Pottinger litigation was ongoing, Hurricane 
Andrew struck Miami, leaving 200,000 additional homeless in 
its wake3 and creating what the Pottinger court termed “a worst 
possible” scenario.4  It was the first time that a hurricane figured 
into homelessness litigation, and it is likely that the outcome of 
the case was in fact affected by the hurricane.  The court held 
Miami officials liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 the 
Eighth Amendment,6 the Fourth Amendment,7 the Due Process 
Clause,8 and the right to travel,9 perhaps in part because the trag-
edy of mass homelessness was showcased by Hurricane An-
drew.  In the face of so great a 
homeless population, the Court 
could not dismissively assume 
that people were homeless as a 
result of a perverse desire to be 
so, nor would it ignore the multi-
ple violations of their constitu-
tional rights. 
The similarities between the 
homelessness scenarios created by Hurricanes Andrew and 
Katrina are startling, each storm leaving behind an unassimi-
lated, newly homeless population to join the already burgeoning 
ranks of America’s homeless population.  While compassion has 
worn thin, evacuees have been ousted from temporary lodging.  
If adequate societal measures are not taken to house these evacu-
ees, they will be forced to live in the streets, parks, and under 
bridges, as were the Pottinger plaintiffs. 
This article will explore the relevance of Pottinger as the 
national homeless population rises to approximately five mil-
lion in the twenty first century.  Part I summarizes the demo-
graphics and causes of mass homelessness and addresses nega-
tive public reactions to the increased visibility of the homeless 
in major American cities.  Part II outlines and discusses the suc-
cessful causes of action brought by the homeless in Pottinger.  
Part III concludes by setting forth proposals that would rein-
vigorate incentives to construct additional affordable housing, 
revisit America’s regressive tax schedule, and afford the home-
less suspect classification. 
OVERVIEW OF HOMELESSNESS BEFORE HURRICANE 
KATRINA 
In 2000, an estimated two million Americans were home-
less on any given night.10  Between 2.5 and 3.5 million Ameri-
cans experienced homelessness every year,11 and 30% of the 
homeless had been without homes for more than two years.12  
These numbers do not include the indeterminate number of indi-
viduals who had no homes and were “doubled up”13 living with 
friends or relatives.  Only those persons “who lack a permanent 
address and sleep in places not designed to be sleeping accom-
modations for human beings... and those living in shelters”14 
were considered homeless.  Thus, those living under the roofs of 
their families and friends did not meet the definition. 
Adult males constituted 44% of the homeless population 
before Hurricane Katrina.15  Women16 accompanied by minor 
children17 were the fastest growing segment of the chronically 
homeless18 and made up 36% of the homeless population.19  
Some 750,000 children were homeless20 before Katrina and 1.5 
million elderly had “worst case housing needs.”21  Fifty percent 
of the homeless were African Americans, 35% White Ameri-
cans, 12% Latinos, 2% Native 
Americans, and 1% were Asian 
Americans.22  The causes of 
America’s rising homelessness 
rate have been debated for dec-
ades.  Some contend that per-
sonal deficiencies such as mental 
illness,23 substance abuse,24 in-
carceration,25 and an intergenera-
tional dependence upon welfare26 are the primary causes of 
homelessness.  Others cite macroeconomic factors such as loss 
of low-income housing,27 unemployment and underemploy-
ment,28 and a regressive tax structure.29 Notably, neither school 
of thought considers the impact of natural disasters. 
Years before Hurricane Katrina created the largest homeless 
population in American history, the public had developed 
“compassion fatigue” with homelessness.30  San Francisco en-
acted a series of ordinances through its so-called Matrix Pro-
gram to criminalize sleeping in a park, begging near a highway, 
or blocking a sidewalk.31  Eleven thousand of San Francisco’s 
poorest people were incarcerated as a result of the Matrix Pro-
gram.32  In Santa Anna, the homeless were rounded up, trans-
ported to a football stadium, physically marked with numbers, 
chained for hours, and ultimately released to a different loca-
tion.33  Massachusetts has imposed criminal sanctions upon 
those who “move about from place to place begging.”34  Ala-
bama has made it a criminal act to wander about “in a public 
place for the purpose of begging.”35 
In response to increasing homelessness in 1984,36 during 
which thousands of individuals were sleeping in Bicentennial 
Park37 and other public venues, Miami police were directed “to 
identify food sources for the poor and to arrest and/or force an 
extraction of the undesirables from the area.”38  To keep the 
homeless moving and effectively “sanitize”39 the parks and 
streets, police were relentless in raiding the campsites of the 
homeless,40summarily destroying all on-site belongings.41 His-
Your house is your larger body 
It grows in the sun and sleeps 
In the stillness of the night; 
And it is not dreamless. 1 
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tory is repeating itself.  In July 2006, Las Vegas enacted an ordi-
nance to ban the giving of food to the homeless.42  A violation of 
the ordinance can be punished by a maximum fine of $1,000 and 
a jail term of up to six months.  
POTTINGER REVISITED 
If America’s Post-Katrina response to the unprecedented 
surge of homelessness is to harass the homeless by jailing them 
or jailing those who feed homeless, the issues and remedies ad-
dressed in Pottinger become relevant again.  These issues and 
remedies are addressed below. 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The most sensitive issue in homelessness litigation concerns 
the voluntariness of the homeless defendant’s actions.  Purely 
involuntary acts cannot properly or morally be condemned as 
crimes under the Eighth Amendment.  To punish a person for 
his or her involuntary act would be cruel.43  The question then is 
whether a homeless person’s acts are voluntary.  A homeless 
person who commits rape cannot reasonably assert homeless-
ness as justification for the misdeeds.  In that case, status as a 
homeless person is irrelevant, and society cannot reasonably be 
expected to tolerate such behavior.  The question is more com-
plex when a homeless defendant with nowhere else to go is 
prosecuted for harmless acts such as sleeping in a park.  Is a 
public action “voluntary” when the homeless defendant must 
perform it to survive, and he has no private place in which to 
perform the action? 
The Pottinger court resolved the question by asking an-
other: is the defendant voluntarily homeless?44  If a defendant 
has voluntarily chosen to be homeless, he could be legally and 
morally deemed to have voluntarily assumed the risk of having 
to break the law to survive.  It is unreasonable for society to 
lower its expectation of public conduct in order to accommodate 
a private and voluntary choice of that character.  However, if the 
defendant’s homelessness is involuntary, a just society should 
not prosecute him for the indicia that attach to the fact of his or 
her homelessness.  The success of the Pottinger case rested in 
large part upon the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that they were 
suffering an involuntary45 state of homelessness and were com-
pelled to perform life-sustaining acts in public view.46 
The United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. Califor-
nia47 held that a defendant could not be criminally punished for 
mere status as a drug addict, finding that a statute that made it 
punishable to be addicted to narcotics constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment.48  In Powell v. Texas,49 the Supreme Court 
addressed a similar issue of whether an alcoholic could be jailed 
for appearing drunk in public.50  The Court held that Powell had 
not been jailed for merely being addicted to alcohol, but for his 
active conduct of appearing in public in a drunken state.51  Pow-
ell is often cited by municipalities that arrest the homeless for 
the proposition that the homeless are not being punished for 
being homeless, but for their actions in violation of the law.  
Such arguments miss the point when the defendant is involuntar-
ily homeless.  The alcoholic, theoretically, can restrict his drink-
ing to his home and avoid punishment, but the homeless have no 
homes in which to perform what are usually private acts.52  
Sleeping in parks, sitting on sidewalks, and begging are perfect 
examples.  To criminalize such actions when they are unavoid-
able is tantamount to prosecuting the homeless for existing, and 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments is impermissibly violated. 
The plaintiffs have historically borne the burden to establish 
that their public actions were, in fact, unavoidable.  In Pottinger, 
the plaintiffs met that burden with statistical evidence and expert 
testimony.53  The plaintiffs offered irrefutable statistical evi-
dence of the severe shortage of beds in homeless shelters in Mi-
ami when they were arrested.54  The expert witnesses also testi-
fied that people seldom choose to be homeless.55  However, pub-
lic policy that requires the homeless to bear the burden of prov-
ing the voluntariness of their status is inherently flawed. 
The homeless, by definition, are persons with extremely 
limited resources, and they are not entitled to state-appointed 
attorneys in civil litigation in defense of their rights.  But for the 
pro bono advocacy of the American Civil Liberties Union,56 the 
Pottinger plaintiffs would have lacked the resources to amass 
statistics proving Miami’s shelters were inadequate to house the 
homeless population.  They also would not have been able to 
procure the experts57 who were pivotal in establishing that peo-
ple are seldom homeless by choice.58  The better public policy 
would allow the plaintiff to meet the burden of a prima facie 
case by establishing the actions committed by the state or mu-
nicipality in violation of his or her rights and the fact of his 
homelessness at the time of arrest.  The burden should then shift 
to the defendants to establish by a preponderance of evidence 
that the plaintiff is voluntarily homeless and thus, answerable 
for his or her public actions.  This policy would serve dual meri-
torious purposes: (i) to enhance the ability of the homeless 
plaintiff to find counsel who would accept his or her case, and 
(ii) to motivate states and their municipalities to cease efforts to 
harass the homeless out of their towns, and instead explore seri-
ous options for providing adequate affordable housing. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The homeless are gravely concerned about the conservation 
of those meager resources that they still have.  In Miami, the 
police frequently destroyed the on-site belongings of the home-
less59 as though the property were public rubbish.  In one par-
ticularly notorious raid, the Miami police handcuffed a group of 
homeless individuals, piled their clothing, medications, and a 
Bible together, and burned them while the homeless watched.60  
The homeless contended that the police seized and destroyed 
their property without due process of law in direct violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.61 
While a seizure of property occurs when there is a 
“meaningful interference” with an individual’s interest in that 
property,62 a seizure of property is unreasonable only if the 
state’s legitimate interests in the seizure do not outweigh the 
individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the object of the 
search.63  The question then is whether the plaintiffs have a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in personal property that may 
appear to others to be public rubbish.  Determining the nature of 
any legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property in-
volves two separate inquiries.  First, the court inquires whether 
the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the ob-
jects.64  Second, the court must determine whether that expecta-
tion is one that society should be prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable.65  If the homeless make efforts to protect their belong-
ings by attempting to shelter them from public view, stacking 
them in organized piles, or designating another homeless person 
to guard them, there is evidence of subjective expectation of 
privacy. 
The second inquiry is more difficult.  Should the public 
recognize the homeless person’s right to privacy when his or her 
property is littering the streets or public parks?  In Rakas v. Illi-
nois,66 the Supreme Court offered guidelines for determining the 
legitimacy of a plaintiff’s privacy interests.  As a trespasser or 
one who leaves property accessible to the public, the plaintiff 
may lose his or her privacy interests in the property; whereas 
one who is lawfully on property and shields it from public view 
may retain a subjective expectation in privacy that the public 
will recognize.  The term trespasser is turned on its head “when 
there is nowhere” private that a homeless person may lawfully 
be.67 
         The Court has not specifically addressed the issue of 
whether a homeless person living outdoors has a privacy interest 
in their property that the public would find reasonable, but a 
Connecticut court has addressed the issue in part.  Based on so-
ciety’s established deferential treatment of closed containers, the 
court in State v. Mooney68  recognized a right of privacy in the 
closed duffel bags of the homeless. The court elaborated: 
[T]he interior of these items is, in effect, the 
defendant’s last shred of privacy from the pry-
ing eyes of outsiders, including the police.  
Our notions of custom and civility, and our 
code of values, would include some measure 
of respect for that shred of privacy, and would 
recognize it as reasonable under the circum-
stances of this case.69 
Does a homeless person have a lesser interest in his clothing 
or medications because he has no duffel bag in which to enclose 
them?  From the perspective of the homeless, the answer is self-
evident.  However, municipalities also have a legitimate interest 
in the sanitation and safety of public spaces,70 which can be 
compromised by the accumulation of rubbish.  The Pottinger 
court balanced the conflicting interests, holding that the home-
less had a legitimate expectation of privacy in their property, so 
long as the property did not create a public danger.71  The court 
held that the city was free to confiscate items such as mattresses 
with exposed springs because such items posed a clear danger.  
However, the court enjoined the destruction of non-harmful pos-
sessions such as Bibles, clothing, eyeglasses, medications, and 
personal identification, and declared such destruction a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.72 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Ordinances that prohibit the homeless from performing in-
nocent, necessary functions in public often fail for vagueness or 
overbreadth.  A statute is vague when it fails to give fair notice 
of the forbidden conduct.73  The Supreme Court held void va-
grancy ordinances in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville be-
cause the statutes did not give sufficiently clear notice of the 
behavior that was prohibited.74  Loitering statutes have suffered 
the same fate.  In 1983, the Supreme Court overturned Califor-
nia’s loitering statute that required citizens wandering the streets 
to produce identification upon a police officer’s request.75  Al-
though the homeless plaintiffs in Pottinger did not attack Mi-
ami’s ordinances on a vagueness theory, the plaintiffs did focus 
on the unconstitutional overbreadth of the ordinances when they 
were applied to innocent conduct of the homeless. 
A statute is overbroad when it reaches constitutionally pro-
tected conduct or conduct which is beyond the power of the state 
to regulate.76  A challenge based upon overbreadth will be up-
held if the enactment reaches “a substantial amount”77 of consti-
tutionally protected conduct.  Prior to Pottinger, there was no 
precedent for acts such as eating, sleeping, and sitting to enjoy 
constitutional protection, unless such acts could be characterized 
as expressive conduct.78  For the most part, however, when the 
homeless eat, sleep, and sit in public, they intend no expressive 
conduct.  They are performing those acts for the same reasons 
the housed perform them:  they are necessary to survival.  How-
ever, the Pottinger court held that when an involuntarily home-
less person performs such acts in public “at a time of day when 
there is no place they can lawfully be,”79 the statute becomes 
overbroad for punishing innocent conduct, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause is impermissibly infringed.80 
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL 
 The Supreme Court has recognized the right to travel as a 
fundamental right in Edwards v. California81 and reaffirmed it 
in Shapiro v. Thompson.82  In striking down a Connecticut stat-
ute denying public assistance to persons who had not been resi-
dents of the state for one year, the Shapiro decision reasoned 
that the statute discouraged travel by the poor by withholding 
benefits from those who would have otherwise qualified to re-
ceive them.83  In 1972, the Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital 
v. Maricopa County84 struck down a statute that conditioned 
free medical care upon a one-year residency requirement.85  
This case is especially significant in homelessness cases because 
the Court specifically denounced the statute for denying indi-
gents “the basic necessities of life”86 and for the deterrent effect 
such statutes have on the rights of the poor to migrate.   
Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, statutes or 
ordinances infringing that right must be in furtherance of a com-
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pelling state interest.87  They must also represent the least intru-
sive method for furthering those state interests.88  State interests 
such as maintaining public spaces in order to promote tourism, 
business, and developing inner-city downtown and park areas 
are not compelling interests.  The Supreme Court has held that 
such interests are substantial but not compelling.89  Further, the 
practice of arresting the homeless is not narrowly tailored to 
achieving the goals of promoting tourism or developing busi-
ness.  The involuntarily homeless arrested under such laws have 
no recourse but to return to their public lives upon their release 
from custody.  Thus, nothing is ultimately accomplished by the 
arrests.  If cities wish to promote their attractiveness to business 
and tourism, they must address both short-term and permanent 
housing for their homeless populations. 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
In 1961, the Supreme Court reinvigorated civil rights pro-
tections that had largely remained dormant for some ninety 
years.  In Monroe v. Pape,90 the Court concluded that a party 
injured by the unconstitutional actions of police officers could 
recover damages in federal court under § 1983.  The police 
broke into the Monroe home, rousted them from bed, and ran-
sacked the house.91  Mr. Monroe was arrested, but was not al-
lowed to call his attorney and was not promptly arraigned.92  
Monroe claimed that he suffered an unlawful search and seizure 
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment.93  He further claimed 
that his constitutional rights had been violated by the detention.  
Reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the claims against the 
police officers,94 the Supreme Court opined that police conduct 
may be actionable when it is in violation of constitutional rights. 
Municipalities may also be held liable for the actions of city 
officials when those officials act to execute a “policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 
may fairly be said to represent official policy.”95  In § 1983 liti-
gation, the homeless plaintiffs also bear the burden of establish-
ing that the actions were both persistent and widespread.96  Evi-
dence that the actions were isolated would be legally insufficient 
to warrant relief against the municipality,97 though the offending 
officers might remain liable for the actions. 
In Pottinger, discovery revealed internal memoranda that 
were “directed to high-ranking police department officials”98 
regarding the need to oust the homeless from Miami’s public 
areas.  The persistent and widespread nature of the attacks on the 
homeless was a matter of public record.  Over 3,500 homeless 
individuals had been arrested in Miami when the suit was filed.  
The city could not escape liability under § 1983 for its acts of 
purposeful harassment of the homeless.99 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
In Harper v. State Board of Elections,100 the Supreme Court 
opined that “wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to 
one's ability to participate in the electoral process.  Lines drawn 
on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are tradi-
tionally disfavored.”101  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
declined every opportunity to grant the homeless the suspect 
classification that is afforded to other historically victimized 
groups.  This status is critical to the homeless population since 
only those state laws that discriminate against suspect groups are 
subjected to strict scrutiny102 and cannot stand unless the state 
demonstrates a compelling interest that is furthered by a nar-
rowly tailored policy.103 
The Supreme Court has adopted the following criteria in its 
suspect-class analysis: (i) whether the disadvantaged class is 
defined by a trait that frequently bears no relationship to ability 
to contribute to society; (ii) whether the class has been saddled 
with unique disabilities because of prejudice and inaccurate 
stereotypes; and (iii) whether the trait defining the class is im-
mutable.104  The homeless can make a strong claim to a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class. 
The homeless are a class defined by their abject poverty, 
and that state of poverty frequently bears no relationship to an 
actual inability to contribute to society.  Many of the homeless 
have strong work histories105 and were rendered homeless by 
events beyond their control.106  One has only to review the acts 
perpetrated against the homeless in Miami and San Francisco to 
be persuaded of the dangerous prejudice of the public against 
the homeless. 
The last prong of analysis proves more challenging.  Do the 
homeless have defining, immutable characteristics?  If the term 
means literally “a characteristic that cannot be changed,” the 
homeless must fail in their attempts to achieve suspect classifi-
cation.  The judicial history of the term does not, however, sug-
gest so rigid a definition.  Aliens, who enjoy protection as a sus-
pect class, can become citizens, thereby changing their 
“immutable” characteristic.  Gender, which is protected, can be 
altered surgically, thus altering the gender characteristic.  By 
analogy, the mere fact that the homeless can again become 
housed does not alter the fact that, while one is in fact homeless, 
it is physically apparent to society. 
The Supreme Court in Lyng107 adopted a broader interpreta-
tion of immutability, including an inquiry as to whether the class 
members “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group.”108  The homeless 
have glaringly distinguishing characteristics: they reside under 
bridges, sleep in parks, shelters and other public places, and they 
beg. 
POTTINGER’S IMPACT 
Litigation in Pottinger spanned a decade.  Ultimately, the 
court enjoined the city of Miami from arresting its homeless so 
long as they ere not engaged in conduct harmful to others or 
themselves.109  Miami was ordered to establish “safe zones”110 
in areas where the homeless could access food programs and 
health services.  The parties ultimately negotiated a financial 
settlement for the homeless plaintiffs.111 
The impact of the case was immediate.  Both the city of 
Miami and other private entities constructed shelters for the 
homeless while the case was on appeal.112  As word spread 
about the decision in Miami, other cities took stock of their own 
practices.  Fort Lauderdale, Florida stopped its “bum sweeps”113 
and began encouraging its officers to refer the homeless to so-
cial services in lieu of making arrests.114 
CONCLUSION 
As America’s homeless population reaches five million 
after Hurricane Katrina, Pottinger-type abuses such as those in 
Las Vegas are to be anticipated unless society becomes pro-
active.  Congress must reinforce incentives for constructing af-
fordable housing and raise the minimum wage.  Meanwhile, 
“safe areas” must be available to those who have nowhere else 
to go, and human resources must be provided to patrol those 
areas to protect homeless men, women, and children from the 
violence of the streets. 
As America’s most vulnerable population, the homeless 
must be afforded a “suspect class” designation.  They are easily 
identified and despised for characteristics they cannot readily 
change.  They have suffered the deprivation of the most funda-
mental rights because their very existence frightens the greater 
population on a visceral level.  The goal, however, is not only to 
place the homeless in a better position to defend their constitu-
tional rights, but to create a society that rejects “compassion 
fatigue” in favor of indefatigable compassion and commit-
ment115 to the welfare of even its poorest citizen. 
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W hen the United States Supreme Court in-structed lower federal courts to enforce Brown v. Board of Education1  “with all deliberate speed,” it made “vagueness and gradualism” its 
official policy for social advancement.2  Fifty years along the 
path of gradualism, has our society lost the ability to make con-
tinuing progress in combating racial discrimination? 
I argue that we have abandoned our commitment to the 
quest for equal treatment, largely because we have failed to un-
derstand the evolving nature of discrimination.  In this article, I 
raise the notion of “force” as an overarching theme that provides 
a means by which to understand the subtler nature of today’s 
discrimination and provides renewed justification for the legal 
regime used to combat it.  This article situates the notion of 
force within the employment discrimination context, partly to 
define a reasonable and representative scope of study, but also in 
response to the rich debate over the last ten years as to whether 
Title VII and other statutes regulating discrimination in the 
workplace should exist at all. 
THE NOTION OF FORCE 
According to civil libertarian legal scholar Richard Epstein, 
Title VII is counterproductive because its inefficiencies cause 
the overall economic pie to shrink, as companies hire fewer 
workers and thereby decrease opportunities for those meant to 
benefit from antidiscrimination laws.3  Epstein argues that the 
market, operating without restrictions, would solve the problem 
of discrimination by accruing competitive advantage to those 
who do not maintain discriminatory practices.  In Epstein’s 
view, what small amount of discrimination remains is both toler-
able and, in fact, productive.4     
Richard McAdams presents an alternative economic theory 
of discrimination termed status-production,5 which posits that 
“discrimination and racist behavior generally are processes by 
which one racial group seeks to produce esteem for itself by 
lowering the status of another group.”6  Within this theory, 
McAdams argues that discrimination will persist in competitive 
markets even though discrimination is, from an economic per-
spective, inefficient and decreases overall wealth because it re-
sults in a diversion of resources and deadweight loss.7  
McAdams presents three explanations as to why discrimination 
will persist in competitive markets:  (1) the power of discrimina-
tory social norms, (2) the existence of “reciprocity” (restricting 
social contact to ingroup members) between whites, and (3) un-
der certain circumstances, the effect of esteem-producing racial 
biases.8  According to McAdams, “the key to understanding 
[discrimination and racist behavior generally] is to perceive its 
subordinating quality.  Status comes about by disparaging oth-
ers, by asserting and reinforcing a claim to superior social 
rank.”9  These explanations highlight an important point: subor-
dinating another group achieves greater esteem for the subordi-
nator by denying the very act of derogation; hence, subtler forms 
of discrimination are more effective than overt ones.   
Epstein’s associational theory, by presenting a world in 
which individuals look innately within their own groups to de-
velop personal connections, lacks any coercive effect.  On the 
other hand, McAdams’ theory focuses quite acutely on the pro-
grammatic domination of one group by another.  This focus on 
force is crucial to the debate because it is force that provides the 
strongest justification for state intervention.  Epstein concedes 
that state intervention was needed in the Jim Crow South, rea-
soning that the explicit use of physical violence and coercion 
kept blacks from participating in markets.10  In his view, the 
distinction between that period and the present one is the ab-
sence of state-sponsored force, a shift he identifies as occurring 
in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.  I argue that Brown merely required a change in the 
form of force.  In a way, the coercive force has moved under-
ground, and McAdams’ status production theory lays the foun-
dation for a more thorough explanation of discriminatory behav-
ior.  
While McAdams’ language sounds of deliberateness, or 
premeditation, in this article I consider the growing evidence 
that subconscious biases contribute to discriminatory outcomes, 
and place this dynamic within the broader notion of force.  In 
doing so, I reject Epstein’s sterile, almost placid, treatment of 
these phenomena as part of innate associational “preferences” or 
“tastes.”  Epstein states that Brown led to cultural and social 
changes to the very fabric of the South and asserts that this 
change resulted in a drastic reduction in the use of force that 
eliminated the need for legal intervention in combating discrimi-
nation.  He does not consider the possibility that previously ac-
ceptable behaviors would not be abandoned but rather replaced 
by new, subtler forms of subordination.  To establish the persis-
tence of force through new forms, then, would be to lay a strong 
challenge at the feet of Epstein and others who concede that 
state intervention was warranted in the Jim Crow South, but 
argue that such intervention is no longer needed today.  
LINGERING FORCE: COGNITIVE                                 
BIASES AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES 
The discriminatory behavior of whites in McAdams’ theory 
is understood as serving to produce and maintain social status.  
To this end, despite the influence of competitive markets, whites 
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use discriminatory social norms and what McAdams terms re-
ciprocity.  This behavior of whites, in McAdams’ approach, is 
treated as purposeful or intentional.  However, these same 
means, and resulting end, may be compounded by implicit atti-
tudes and unintentional motivations.  Indeed, they may even be 
the result of healthy cognitive functioning.  A study of these 
forms will buttress McAdams’ theory of status production while 
providing further evidence of ongoing force unaccounted for in, 
and contrary to, Epstein’s assumptions.  
COGNITIVE BIASES AS FORCE 
Linda Hamilton Krieger’s 1995 article, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, presents a detailed study of 
behavioral research on cognitive biases and their implications on 
established legal doctrine.11  Krieger explains that in the 1970s, 
psychologists began to recognize that intergroup biases could 
result not only from motivational processes but also from typical 
cognitive processes.  Called social cognition theory, psycholo-
gists began to identify “normal” cognitive processes like catego-
rization and information processing that could also create and 
reinforce racial biases.12  According to this view, stereotyping is 
a cognitive process, resembling categorization, that alters per-
ception, interpretation and other forms of information process-
ing in predictable ways.13   
Social cognition theory suggests that individuals who may 
not harbor racist beliefs may nonetheless suffer from unintended 
but systematic prejudice as a result of categorization-like stereo-
types.  Behavioral experiments have shown that when individu-
als are divided into groups, even for trivial or random reasons, 
they display strong biases in their perception of differences and 
in the evaluation and reward of ingroup versus outgroup mem-
bers.14  Subjects perceive ingroup members as more similar and 
outgroup members as more different than when those same per-
sons are viewed in the absence of groupings.  In addition, sub-
jects are better able to recall undesirable behavior when commit-
ted by outgroup members instead of ingroup members, signifi-
cantly overrate the product of their own group in comparison to 
that of outgroups, and disproportionately attribute ingroup mem-
bers’ failures to situational factors (i.e. environmental or contex-
tual factors) and outgroup members’ failures to dispositional 
factors (i.e. personal attributes or traits).15   
In addition to categorization-based biases, social cognition 
theorists have also identified biases resulting from salience-
based cognitive distortions in perception and memory.  Studies 
have found that individuals judge the actions of minorities in 
more extreme ways when they are token members of a group 
than when they are members of a fully integrated group.16  In 
one study, white males and females evaluated law school appli-
cations containing incidental indications of the applicants’ race.  
Evaluators judged black applicants with strong credentials more 
favorably than otherwise identical white applicants, and judged 
black applicants with weak credentials less favorably than other-
wise identical white applicants.17   
According to some theorists, these studies show that we pay 
more attention to stimulus objects that are more salient or dis-
tinctive, and as a result more information about these objects is 
perceived, encoded and stored in memory.18  Thus, because data 
regarding such stimuli are more available to the perceiver, im-
pressions formed under conditions of high attention have a 
greater valence, positive or negative, explaining the polarized 
evaluation phenomena.19  An alternative explanation of the po-
larization findings incorporates previous studies showing that 
individuals perceive ingroup members as relatively heterogene-
ous, or complex, while they view outgroup members as rela-
tively homogeneous.20 As a result, they have an increased appre-
ciation of complexities in evaluating ingroup members and 
greater awareness of the inadequacy of available information,21 
and thus are more cautious in their judgments.22  In contrast, 
evaluations of undifferentiated outgroup members are more 
broad and inexact, generally either “good” or “bad.”23   
The studies above regarding categorization and salience 
constitute cognitive sources of stereotypes and schemas, acting 
as a lens through which subsequent events are viewed.  How do 
these schemas influence behavior?  A 1980 study using school-
age children examined the effect of social schemas on the inter-
pretation of ambiguous information, presenting cartoon draw-
ings and verbal descriptions of a scene in which one student was 
poking a classmate in the back with a pencil.24  Asked to rate the 
behavior of the offending student, the study found that switching 
the race of the actor had a significant impact on the manner in 
which the children categorized the behavior.  Specifically, sub-
jects judged the behavior of black actors to be more mean and 
threatening, and less playful and friendly, while the opposite 
result obtained when the actor was white.25 
A further example of schematic distortion affects how we 
attribute causes to events.  This analysis expands upon research 
regarding “fundamental attribution error,” in which people tend 
to underestimate the impact of situational factors and overesti-
mate the impact of dispositional factors.26  A variation on this, 
known as the “ultimate attribution error,” relates directly to the 
categorization-based biases identified above, showing that peo-
ple tend to attribute desirable ingroup behaviors to internal, dis-
positional factors but attribute similar behavior by outgroup 
members to environmental causes.27  One such study found that 
subjects perceived misconduct to be more likely to recur where 
the behavior was in accordance with stereotypes of the actor’s 
ethnicity than when stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-
neutral.  Furthermore, when misconduct was stereotype-
inconsistent or stereotype-neutral, subjects were better able to 
recall information about surrounding life circumstances of the 
transgressor.28  
In the employment setting, the implications of these studies 
on how cognitive processes shape perceptions and influence 
behavior are numerous.  Racial minorities are more likely to be 
alienated as a result of overperceived differences and are more 
likely to have their work undervalued as compared to that of 
majority (ingroup) members.  In addition, any mistakes they 
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make at work weigh more heavily in their supervisors’ minds 
and are more likely to be attributed to personal, and not situ-
ational, factors, and hence result in more negative personal judg-
ments.  These concerns are only exacerbated by salience-based 
distortions, such that racial minorities in predominantly white 
employment settings are susceptible to evaluation in the ex-
tremes.  While the data also shows that their successes are also 
viewed more positively, the net effect may only be more alien-
ation from co-workers.   
In this setting, where there appears to be little room for er-
ror for racial minorities in the cognitive minds of their employ-
ers, the studies also show that minorities do not get the benefit 
of the doubt.  Instead, in the plethora of ambiguous circum-
stances that can arise in the workplace, existing schema and 
causal distortions will act to place a thumb on the scale against 
minority employees.  That is, it is likely that a racial minority 
involved in a verbal dispute in the workplace will not be seen as 
passionate or playful but aggressive and threatening; and, this 
aggressive and threatening behavior is more likely to be attrib-
uted to individual character than surrounding circumstances.  In 
this way, the conduct will appear worse, present less opportunity 
for mitigation or rehabilitation, and thus result in more drastic 
consequences.  Without ever injecting motivational or inten-
tional racial attitudes, cognitive biases present the possibility of 
just such a playing field.  This series of cognitive operations in 
the minds of employers did not cease the day Brown v. Board of 
Education was decided, nor did it cease the following day.   
IMPLICIT ATTITUDES 
The operation of force via subtle, often subconscious and un-
knowing, discrimination is further evidenced through tests 
measuring explicit versus implicit attitudes.  Generally, these 
tests show that even individuals who believe that they hold no 
prejudices towards racial minorities nonetheless harbor such 
negative attitudes at a strikingly high rate.29  Unlike the cogni-
tive bias studies discussed above, which focused on bias-
creating effects (or byproducts) of otherwise normal cognitive 
functioning, implicit attitudes tests allow for the inference that 
individuals who believe they hold no negative racial prejudice 
nonetheless harbor such attitudes as the result of social condi-
tioning and cultural or other experiential factors.  While sharing 
the unintentionality of cognitive biases, implicit attitudes can be 
seen as closer to overt discrimination in that they reflect learned 
behavior or the suppression of previously held overt attitudes.30  
They may also be confirmation of the cognitive bias effect, re-
flecting the inevitable progression of cognitive-based stereo-
types or schemas into implicit attitudes.  Either way, implicit 
attitudes present a second way of capturing the subtle force that 
continues to operate in the post-Brown era.   
 Implicit Association Tests (hereinafter “IAT”) are a method 
of indirectly measuring the strengths of associations among con-
cepts.31  IATs are presented on web-based computer interfaces 
in which instances of four concepts must be sorted using only 
two options, each of which is assigned to two concepts.32  The 
IAT rationale is that people will find it easier to sort a pair of 
concepts when they are closely associated than when they are 
weakly associated.  Ease of sorting is indexed both by the speed 
of responding and the frequency of errors, where faster respond-
ing and fewer errors indicate stronger associations.  Basically, if 
you respond faster when “white” and “good” are paired than 
when “black” and “good” are paired, your score would reflect a 
preference for whites.33 
 Immediately prior to taking the IAT, subjects are asked to 
complete a short questionnaire asking about their explicit prefer-
ences among the concepts used in the upcoming IAT and includ-
ing basic demographic information.34  In this way, IATs are able 
to compare conscious, explicit attitudes against unconscious, 
implicit ones.  One study, conducted on the original IAT website 
between October 1998 and April 2000, consisted of 541,696 
interpretable tests,35 of which approximately 221,000 responses 
were black-white racial attitudes tests (both name and face-
based).36  Analysis of the preference among test takers found 
that 73% of test-takers automatically favor white over black, and 
as many as 88% of test-takers showed either pro-white or anti-
black preferences.37  On the explicit measure, whites showed a 
preference for white over black, but black respondents showed 
an even stronger preference for black over white.  However, on 
the implicit measure, whites showed a strong preference 
(significantly stronger than the magnitude of explicit preference) 
for white, while black respondents showed a weak preference 
for white over black.38  
 New studies that place the IAT in various contextual set-
tings supplement the notion of environmental factors as the 
source of implicit attitudes and raise possibilities as to how we 
can combat the effects of these biases.  Studies have shown that 
situational factors, like receiving the IAT from a black experi-
menter or being shown pictures of, or made to think about, ad-
mired black individuals like Martin Luther King, Jr., Michael 
Jordan, and Bill Cosby, can lower bias scores.39 Similarly, test-
takers display reduced implicit gender biases when asked to re-
flect beforehand on certain questions, like “What are strong 
women like?”40   
 In terms of implications on actual behavior, one study found 
that those test-takers who showed the strongest implicit racial 
biases, when given the option of working with a white or black 
partner, tended to choose a white partner.  Another experiment 
found that those who showed strong implicit preference for het-
erosexuals over homosexuals were more likely to avoid eye con-
tact and show signs of unfriendliness when introduced to some-
one who they were told was gay.  Finally, a German study found 
that volunteers whose results suggested more bias against Turks 
(an immigrant group in Germany) were more likely to find a 
Turkish suspect guilty when asked to make a judgment about 
criminality in an ambiguous situation.41 
 While critics of both cognitive bias and implicit association 
theories exist, these studies are oft-repeated and consistent with 
traditional laboratory findings.42  Moreover, in analyzing the 
results of various experiments simulating different hiring-related 
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decisions, their explanatory power is tremendous.  For example, 
in 2003, Bertrand and Mullainathan conducted a now-famous 
study in which Boston and Chicago-area employers were sent 
fictitious resumes that were identical except for interchanging 
African-American and white applicant names.43  The study 
found that applicants with white-sounding names received fifty 
percent more callbacks from potential employers.44  Another 
famous study analyzed the hiring practices at eight leading or-
chestras dating back to the 1960s.45  In response to concerns of 
gender bias in hiring, many orchestras in the 1970s and 1980s 
shifted from conductors hand-picking new members to a blind 
jury-selection process in which applicants performed behind a 
screen in order to conceal their identity, creating a unique oppor-
tunity to test for gender-biased hiring.   The use of the screen led 
to a 50% increase in women advancing out of the preliminary 
rounds and a 30% increase in their chances of being hired in the 
final rounds.46     
Although interconnected, it is important to recognize that 
the source of cognitive biases and implicit associations are pre-
sumably different.  In one case, it is the cognitive processes that 
are considered healthy and crucial; in the other, it is the absorp-
tion of cultural and situational norms.  Together, they demand a 
shift in focus from our words and thoughts to our subconscious 
motivations.  Moreover, the force of cognitive biases is particu-
larly powerful because of where this manifestation occurs: at the 
subconscious level.  Greater esteem is achieved for a subordinat-
ing group when it can deny the act of subordinating, making its 
status appear innate or natural, as opposed to constructed.  
IMPACT OF SUBCONSCIOUS BIAS ON                                
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
By placing the operation of force, at least in part, at the cog-
nitive level and recognizing that even individuals who do not 
intend to discriminate are nonetheless influenced by implicit 
biases, it is possible to argue that discrimination is not the ex-
ception but the rule in today’s workplace.  Decisions in which 
ambiguity and subjectivity are abundant are highly susceptible 
to the influence of bias.  In the employment setting, subjective 
decision making is commonplace.  So, how much discrimination 
occurs in the workplace? 
Survey data on personal experiences with employment dis-
crimination suggest that while discriminators may not recognize 
that their decisions are clouded by subtle, subconscious biases, 
victims do.  According to national Gallup polls, the percentage 
of African Americans reporting that they were discriminated 
against “at [their] place of work within the last 30 days varied 
between 21% and 18% for the years 1997 through 2001.”47  
Thirty-three percent of African Americans and Latinos reported 
that at least one time at their job, they were not offered a job that 
a white person got because of racial discrimination, and thirty-
one percent reported being passed over for a promotion that was 
offered to a white person because of racial discrimination.48   
Researchers at Rutgers University conducted a 2002 study 
focused specifically on employees and found that 10% of em-
ployees said they had been “treated unfairly at their workplace 
because of their race or ethnicity.”  Among this group, 28% re-
ported being passed over for promotion, 21% reported being 
assigned undesirable tasks, and 16% reported hearing racist 
comments.  Among African Americans, over half of those sur-
veyed “knew of” discrimination in the workplace in the last 
year, and 28% had themselves experienced racial discrimination 
in the last year.  Given the pervasive nature of subtle forms of 
discrimination and the tiny percentage of employees perceiving 
discrimination who actually file claims, one begins to wonder 
not why there are so many employment discrimination claims 
but why there are so few.49 
Admittedly, other scholars have considered the meaning of 
these subtle forms of discrimination on employment relation-
ships and the surrounding legal regime.50  My effort here is to 
place these ideas within a more comprehensive framework for 
understanding how discrimination operates in our society.  More 
narrowly, I hope these studies rebut the fallacy of Epstein’s 
force-free, post-Brown America.  
MARKET FORCE: HOW BUSINESS CYCLES                  
EXERT DISCRIMINATORY FORCE 
Here, my endeavor is to consider the relationship between 
market fluctuations and other force phenomena, including the 
subtle biases discussed above.  The employment setting is an apt 
one for the study of force.  For one, it is an area in which dis-
criminatory behavior has been historically pervasive.  Moreover, 
the plethora of data and statistics available for study provide a 
practical reason for studying employment discrimination.   
By way of background, in order for a complaint of discrimi-
nation to become a lawsuit in federal court, an employee must 
first file a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”).  After a brief investigation, the 
EEOC determines whether a case is worth pursuing.  If so, it 
may work with the parties to obtain a settlement or sue on behalf 
of the employee.  In all other cases, the EEOC issues a “right to 
sue” letter to the employee, at which point an aggrieved em-
ployee can file a lawsuit in federal court.51  Thus, the two major 
sources of data are the EEOC’s Annual Charge Statistics and the 
Judicial Facts and Figures maintained by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts.52  
 The intuition regarding the relationship between business 
cycles and employment discrimination is simple: when unem-
ployment rates are low, jobs are available in abundance, so em-
ployees who experience discrimination have attractive alterna-
tives to litigation; when unemployment rates are high, jobs are 
scarce and employees will stay put in a discriminatory work 
setting, at least for a while.  Meanwhile, employers concerned 
about turnover and associated costs have fewer incentives to 
prevent such treatment during periods of high unemployment, 
when they can easily find attractive candidates to replace ag-
grieved employees.  A separate factor supporting this expected 
effect is that periods of greater unemployment will inevitably be 
accompanied by a greater number of discrimination-inducing 
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events – that is, layoffs and firings.53 
Economists John Donohue III and Peter Siegelman con-
ducted a comprehensive empirical study of the explanations for 
fluctuations in the amount of employment discrimination litiga-
tion, based on data from 1970-1989.54  In part, Donohue and 
Siegelman were trying to understand why employment discrimi-
nation lawsuits in federal court grew 2166% from 1970-1989 
while the general civil caseload only grew only 125% over the 
same period.  As an initial matter, they found that the volume of 
employment discrimination displayed two patterns: (1) a general 
upward trend in the long- term, and (2) erratic fluctuations 
around this trend in the short-term.55  They also found that the 
combination of upward trend over time and the lagged unem-
ployment rates explained 96% of the variance in the number of 
suits.56   
Applying a similar series of regressions to quantify the im-
pact of various factors likely to contribute to the long-term, up-
ward trend,57 Donohue and Siegelman concluded that almost 
20% of the increased volume of employment discrimination 
litigation over the period from 1970-1989 could be explained by 
rising unemployment.58  
In one sense, unemployment rates themselves contain a 
racially discriminatory component.  Research shows that non-
white workers experience a significantly higher rate of unem-
ployment than white workers.  Unemployment rates among Af-
rican Americans and Latinos are consistently higher than for 
whites, and African Americans in particular have consistently 
experienced approximately twice the level of unemployment as 
whites.59  In this way, unemployment rates exert market force 
through their inherently racially-disparate functioning.  In the 
following section, I delve deeper into market operations to con-
sider how shifts in the unemployment rate may catalyze and 
exert force. .  
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND EMPLOYER                            
BEHAVIOR AS FORCE 
As economists acknowledge, weak labor markets may cre-
ate an incentive for employers to “indulge in discriminatory 
preferences” as a result of the excess supply of labor, with an 
available pool of workers that presumably includes many tal-
ented and qualified workers.  Employers may also see economic 
downturns as an opportunity to weed out minority employees 
who they perceive as underperforming or problematic by urging 
them to quit.  Economists question this incentive by pointing to 
the high cost of firing, suggesting that the costs of potential em-
ployment discrimination litigation create a disincentive to be-
have in a discriminatory manner, and thus neutralize the labor 
availability effect.60  However, this theory rests on the assump-
tion that a significant portion of individuals who are discrimi-
nated against will actually bring claims.  The assumption is 
hasty. 
In the Rutgers survey, discussed in Part II, supra, 34% of 
those who reported racial discrimination in the workplace did 
not do anything, and only 3% said that they actually sued their 
company or co-worker.  Among African Americans who per-
ceived discrimination, less than 1% (0.85%) actually filed a for-
mal complaint with the EEOC, and less than one quarter of one 
percent (0.22%) actually file a federal lawsuit.61  Indeed, an em-
ployer seeking to push people out could be quite successful in 
doing so without facing a lawsuit: at least four times as many 
people will quit than file a formal complaint with the EEOC, 
and 16 times as many will quit than file a suit in federal court.62   
Donohue and Siegelman engage in an extensive analysis of 
EEOC and federal court data to address the possibility of in-
creased employer discrimination during periods of high unem-
ployment.63  They conclude that no such rise in discriminatory 
behavior occurs among employers.64  In support of their conclu-
sion, Donohue and Siegelman identify several empirical find-
ings that contradict the causality of employer behavior.  First, 
they posit that the federal government would not experience 
incentives to discriminate in the way private employers would, 
and thus data showing that suits against the federal government 
follow the same unemployment-related pattern as suits against 
private employers can only be attributed to the worker benefits 
effect.65  Second, they note that the upswing in employment 
litigation begins within one or two quarters of the economic 
downturn, though it usually takes longer to satisfy the adminis-
trative and procedural requirements for filing suit in federal 
court, suggesting that increased federal court filings are based 
on complaints filed with the EEOC prior to the upswing in un-
employment rates (and any associated increase in employer dis-
crimination).66  Third, they find that while the number of federal 
court filings increase in recessions, the number of EEOC 
charges remains relatively constant, a pattern inconsistent with 
increased employer discrimination.67   
Having laid out their argument against increased employer 
discrimination, Donohue and Siegelman go on to hypothesize as 
to the empirical results one may expect to find as a result of a 
worker benefits effect, eventually showing that the predicted 
results do indeed occur.  Under a worker benefits effect, periods 
of higher unemployment lead to increased durations of unem-
ployment, and therefore greater backpay awards.  Larger dam-
age awards result not only in the established increase in litiga-
tion, but also make cases with a lower probability of success 
more attractive by increasing the possible rewards of successful 
litigation.  Indeed, looking at figures from the same period, 
Donohue and Siegelman find a small decrease in plaintiff win 
rates and larger damages awards as unemployment rates rise.68  
In sum, Donohue and Siegelman create a seemingly impenetra-
ble argument rejecting the employer behavior effect and lending 
strong support for a worker benefits effect.69 
Nonetheless, I advocate for caution in interpreting their 
findings.  While the strength of their argument rests in its reli-
ance on empirical support from employment litigation data, so 
too may its weakness.  I argue that documented evidence of ju-
dicial hostility to employment discrimination litigation may very 
well poison the well of federal court data used in their findings.  
This hostility calls for a reinterpretation of their data to consider 
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the possibility of increased employer discrimination during eco-
nomic downturns.   
MARKET FORCE AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
The worker benefits effect essentially argues that, in eco-
nomic downturns, relatively little changes besides the cost cal-
culus of employees.  Even assuming this is true, I argue that the 
worker benefits effect should be understood within the rubric of 
force.  The fact that longer durations of unemployment make it 
more economically viable to bring a claim does not, in and of 
itself, imply that employees are bringing weaker or more frivo-
lous claims.  Indeed, the very nature of backpay awards creates a 
wage threshold whereby high-earning victims of discrimination 
are more likely to find it worthwhile to sue than low-earning 
workers.  The marginally lower-earning worker whose claim is 
made worthwhile by the increased length of unemployment is no 
less meritorious.  Instead, valuing a discrimination claim based 
on the length of unemployment, rather than the actual discrimi-
natory conduct, merely highlights the unfortunate impact – call 
it force – on low-wage victims of discrimination as a result of a 
backpay-based remedy structure.  After presenting evidence of 
judicial hostility in the next section, I consider whether victims 
of discrimination are penalized for bringing their claims during 
periods of high unemployment . 
JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO EMPLOYMENT                       
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 
In 1997, the Second Circuit instituted a task force to study 
the issue of gender, racial, and ethnic fairness in its courts.70  
Generally, the task force began by surveying judges, court em-
ployees and attorneys about their observations of gender, racial, 
and ethnic bias in the courthouse.  In regards to bias directed at 
attorneys, the survey found that judges observed almost no ra-
cial or ethnic bias against minority attorneys, an observation 
shared by white male and white female courtroom employees.71  
Among minority law clerks and courtroom deputies, on the 
other hand, 24% reported observing a minority attorney's com-
petence challenged because of his or her race or ethnicity, and 
19% report observing a minority attorney mistaken for a non-
attorney.72  Among minority attorneys, 39% reported that they 
"often" or "occasionally" observed various kinds of incidents of 
racial or ethnic bias directed at minority attorneys, including 
derogatory racial or ethnic comments; 46% reported being ig-
nored, interrupted, or not listened to; and 52% had been mis-
taken for a non-attorney.73 
As previously noted, employment discrimination litigation 
in federal court increased by 2166% from 1970-1989, versus a 
125% increase in the overall civil caseload.  Between 1992 and 
1997, the volume of discrimination cases nearly doubled.74  
Meanwhile, judicial attitudes toward employment discrimination 
litigation reflect what can only be described as disgust.  In a 
1994 New York Times article, a former federal judge complained 
that discrimination cases are an unjustifiable consumer of judi-
cial time because they are “rarely settled, are characterized by 
high levels of acrimony and subjective claims of victimization; 
they are immensely time consuming and are controlled by legal 
standards that, lacking sufficient precision, are overgeneralized 
and of marginal use.”75  The Second Circuit Task Force found 
that other judges privately agreed that the Times’ article cap-
tured the views of colleagues who felt the cases were "small 
potatoes," clogging up the federal courts and diverting judges' 
attention from larger, purportedly more significant, civil cases.76 
Statistically, in the few employment discrimination cases 
that do make it to trial,77 plaintiffs are almost twice as likely to 
win before a jury as they are in a bench trial.78  From 1990 to 
2001, plaintiffs’ win rates before juries ranged from 36-44% 
while win rates before judges ranged from 14-33%.79  Despite 
plaintiffs’ minimal chances of making it to trial and obtaining a 
favorable decision, they fair even worse on appeal.  In fact, the 
differential between plaintiff and defendant success rates is 
greater in employment discrimination cases than any other cate-
gory of civil cases.80  When an employment discrimination de-
fendant wins at trial and the case is reviewed on appeal, only 
5.8% of those judgments are reversed. By contrast, when an 
employment discrimination plaintiff wins at trial and the case is 
reviewed on appeal, 43.61% of those judgments are reversed.81  
Looking solely at post-verdict defense motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, proceedings with historically low 
rates of success, five out of six such appeals resulted in reversals 
in the Second Circuit from 1992 through 1995.82   
In a sense, these results are not surprising.  There is little 
reason to believe that federal judges, who are predominantly 
white and the majority of whom are men, are any less suscepti-
ble than the general population to cognitive or implicit biases in 
decision making.  Perhaps, part of the problem can be attributed 
to a legal regime that is too onerous on plaintiffs and inconsis-
tent with the realities of modern discrimination.  In sum, anec-
dotal evidence of judicial attitudes, lower win percentages at 
trial before judges than juries, and the widespread perception of 
bias among minority employees (and attorneys), all evince a 
certain judicial hostility toward employment discrimination 
claims. 
A CRITIQUE OF DONAHUE AND SIEGELMAN 
        Donohue and Siegelman fail to account for evidence of the 
increasingly aggressive use of summary judgment by defendants 
in the area of employment discrimination.83  In light of the evi-
dence discussed above, summary judgment effectively precludes 
the jury’s opportunity to perform its traditional duty while si-
multaneously transferring authority to hostile judicial decision-
makers.   
 Donohue and Siegelman argue that increased rates of settle-
ment and decreased plaintiff win rates at trial during periods of 
high unemployment lend support to the worker benefits effect.84  
Assuming as they do that “weaker” claims (defined as those 
with lower probabilities of success) represent the majority of 
additional cases during market downturns, and that weak claims 
are likely to settle, increased rates of settlement and lower win 
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rates at trial support their theory.85  However, given the growing 
success of employer motions for summary judgment, in con-
junction with the proposal that the incremental, or additional, 
recessionary claim is weaker, employers should seek and win a 
greater number of summary judgment claims.  Therefore, a bet-
ter test of whether weaker claims are brought during recessions 
would study whether rates of summary judgment increased dur-
ing periods of high unemployment.86  Correspondingly, rates of 
settlement should have a smaller, or negligible, correlation with 
high unemployment.  Any actual increase in settlements, then, 
or findings showing a lack of correlation between summary 
judgment and increased unemployment, may instead reflect a 
greater quantity or magnitude of employer discrimination.87  
Similarly, we know it is a rare employment discrimination plain-
tiff who refuses settlement, overcomes a motion for summary 
judgment and makes it to trial;88 presumably even rarer would 
be such a result for one who brings an incrementally “weaker” 
claim during a period of high unemployment.  Among the few 
cases that make it to trial, then, the win rates should remain rela-
tively constant.  Lower plaintiff win rates, in turn, may reflect 
judicial animosity.89     
 One may be skeptical of the idea that judges are intention-
ally hostile to claims of discrimination, but subtle biases provide 
a way of understanding observed judicial hostility to employ-
ment discrimination litigation as the result of subconscious in-
fluences.   Unlike cell phones and cameras, subconscious biases 
are not checked at the courthouse door.  In fact, the differing 
perceptions of discrimination toward minority employees by 
white versus minority employees in the workplace90 are consis-
tent with the differing perceptions of discrimination towards 
minority attorneys by white versus minority attorneys and court-
room employees in the courthouse.91  Indeed, law clerks and 
courtroom employees identified behaviors that would reflect the 
operation of categorization-induced biases and negative sche-
mas, including challenges to the competence of minority attor-
neys and mistaken assumptions that they were non-attorneys.   
 The intentional-sounding theory presented previously, in 
which employers increase discriminatory force during periods of 
high unemployment, can be presented in nonmotivational terms.  
Employers seeking to make workforce reductions in order to 
take advantage of the large labor pool will likely seek to push 
out those who are seen as difficult or as underperformers.  
Again, this determination itself would be influenced by previous 
judgments contaminated by subtle biases.  In a recession, choos-
ing whom to terminate among a group of adequately performing 
individuals introduces greater ambiguity, and hence greater sus-
ceptibility to the effects of cognitive biases. Finally, subtle bi-
ases may also interact with market forces through the behavior 
of co-workers.  Innate ingroup preferences are likely to serve an 
unknowing status-producing end among white employees, such 
that individuals who are socially isolated from their work teams, 
who are more likely to be outgroup employees, would be most 
vulnerable.   
 These dynamics, if associated with market downturns, could 
cast doubt on Donohue and Siegelman’s findings.  For example, 
employer behavior in market downturns may place increased 
pressure on a set of vulnerable employees without increasing the 
number of total employees subject to discrimination, explaining 
the lack of cyclicality in EEOC charges.  Similarly, employers 
may take small steps to reduce costs or take advantage of in-
creased labor in anticipation of market downturns and associ-
ated increases in unemployment.  If so, the upturn in employ-
ment litigation within only two quarters after the onset of market 
downturns92 may be consistent with increased employer dis-
crimination.  While these dynamics present a rebuttal to 
Donohue and Siegelman, when understood in full they present a 
way of understanding the relationship between subtle biases, 
employer behavior and market conditions.  
A FORCE-BASED PRESCRIPTION 
Through cognitive and implicit biases, we learn that nega-
tive racial attitudes are pervasive and affect decision-making on 
all levels, even among those who genuinely believe they are 
acting in a race-neutral manner.  The employment setting, 
wrought with ambiguous and subjective decision making at all 
stages of interracial interactions, from hiring to firing, raises 
basic questions about the sort of remedy, and proof structure, 
that should be implemented to combat such discrimination. 
The two major frameworks used to argue workplace dis-
crimination claims are disparate treatment and disparate impact.  
Under disparate treatment, an employee must prove that the em-
ployer’s decision was motivated by a racially discriminatory 
purpose.  Under disparate impact, employees can forgo a show-
ing of discriminatory purpose by identifying a facially-neutral 
employment policy that has a disproportionate impact, or effect, 
on racial minorities.93  In practice, neither adequately captures 
the operation of subtle forms of force.  Disparate treatment, with 
its focus on intent, or purpose, is immediately deficient.  More-
over, its traditional proof structure requires the identification of 
a similarly situated member of another race who was treated 
differently.  Yet cognitive biases teach us that employers, un-
knowingly, may perceive differences in qualifications or per-
formance between two virtually identical, or “similarly situated” 
individuals as a result of ingroup versus outgroup status.  This 
difference will then be articulated as a challenge to the em-
ployee’s attempt to identify a similarly situated individual.   
Disparate impact seems better suited to remedy discrimina-
tion rooted in the subconscious because of its substitution of 
effect for intent.  However, disparate impact theory, as applied 
currently, is also problematic.  First, it requires the identification 
of a specific, facially-neutral policy or practice that constitutes 
the source of the disparate impact.  Decisions infused with bias-
susceptible subjectivity do not easily lend themselves to this 
causal attribution.  We are not talking about an employer policy 
that says all employees must live within a two mile radius of 
work; we are talking about interviews, performance reviews, 
and everyday interactions that are capable of producing system-
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atically-biased outcomes.  Second, even if a causal relationship 
between a specific practice and a racially disparate outcome can 
be established, courts are likely to be extremely reluctant to tell 
an employer that they cannot engage in many of these practices, 
especially if the employer can prove that the practice is consis-
tent with business necessity.  
I argue for a bias-sensitive theory of discrimination in 
which disparate treatment still provides the basic framework but 
where the focus shifts from establishing that there was a dis-
criminatory purpose to establishing that discriminatory biases, 
explicit or implicit, permeated the employer’s decision.  In the 
process, evidence of racially disproportionate outcomes, di-
vorced from any particular practices, could constitute a single 
relevant factor in attempting to prove the role of force in deci-
sion making.  The crucial components, however, are the relevant 
facts and the inferences that can be drawn from them.94 
By presenting a more accurate picture of how discrimina-
tion operates, force theory’s most useful contribution may be in 
providing guidance as to what facts are relevant and what 
weight should be given to each. For example, the cognitive bias 
studies discussed above suggest that cases involving minority 
employees who are in predominantly homogeneous groups, 
where they are “token” members of their race, should raise red 
flags.  These employees are more likely to be victims of ingroup 
preferences, are more likely to be judged negatively for ambigu-
ous actions, and are more likely to be judged harshly for rela-
tively minor performance deficiencies.  Similarly, regardless of 
the racial composition of the workplace, ingroup preferences 
will often be proxied by particular negative assessments of out-
group employees.  For example, social isolation caused by in-
group preferences may be seen as “not being a team player.”  In 
addition, the overall market conditions and unemployment rate 
may also provide useful contextual information about the force 
at play in the workplace at the time of relevant decision making.   
Similarly, cognitive biases suggest that certain inferences 
and presumptions should be given little or no weight in assess-
ing whether force contaminated an employment decision.  For 
example, because studies show that outgroup members are more 
likely to be judged in extremes, both positively and negatively, a 
few highly-placed African American executives within a com-
pany would provide little evidence of non-discriminatory deci-
sion making.  Similarly, evidence of bias in mental processing 
would advocate for the abolition of the “same actor” presump-
tion, a judicially-created legal standard holding that “where the 
hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of 
employment occurs within a relatively short time span following 
the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a 
determining factor for the adverse action taken by the em-
ployer.”95  As a result of cognitive biases, it is perfectly plausi-
ble that a hirer would recruit a minority employee and then later 
judge that individual negatively in various ambiguous situations 
because of unknowing biases.  Or, upon a single perceived defi-
ciency or error by a minority employee, the hirer may subcon-
sciously reorient the minority employee within a negative racial 
schema that he had previously thought the employee tran-
scended on the basis of her application or interview.  In turn, 
from that point forth, ambiguous situations are more likely to be 
understood in a schema-consistent way and these schema-
consistent activities are more likely than schema-inconsistent 
activities to be recalled by the hirer when making later firing, 
promotion and demotion decisions.  By presenting a more com-
plicated picture of decision making, where subconscious consid-
erations influence determinations, inferential shortcuts require 
questioning.   
Where factual circumstances play such an important role, 
factfinders should be armed with the tools to properly weigh 
relevant evidence.  By training federal judges on their own hos-
tility to employment litigation, statistical evidence of the preva-
lence of employment discrimination, and the impact of cognitive 
biases on decision making, judges may be in a better position to 
determine whether context-providing facts are relevant.  For 
example, courts may need to allow for more scrutinizing review 
of past performance, placing a greater burden on employers to 
justify negative determinations based on ambiguous conduct.  In 
addition, minority plaintiffs may be able to support an inference 
of bias by applying the common disparate treatment strategy of 
identifying ingroup members who were “similarly situated” but 
treated differently (more favorably).  Courts, in turn, must rec-
ognize the role of subtle biases in shaping the very determina-
tion of whether a given ingroup member was actually “similarly 
situated.”  As an example, an employer will likely deny that two 
employees are similarly situated by citing the minority em-
ployee’s greater number of warnings/reprimands, or by identify-
ing more negative performance evaluations.  Yet, the differing 
patterns of behavior may be nothing more than manifestations of 
the employer’s subconscious biases.  Therefore, courts should 
engage in a thorough review of past actions that constitute nega-
tive assessments to determine whether biases have contaminated 
employers’ very evidence of nondiscrimination.  Similarly, co-
worker testimony as to these previous disputes may prove infor-
mative (and could warrant more or less weight depending on 
ingroup or outgroup status, for example).  Finally, the strikingly 
common use of summary judgment is particularly disturbing, as 
the notion of force illustrates that factual circumstances in the 
employment setting are both complicated and conceptually cru-
cial.   
In the section above, I have tried to present some of the 
implications of a broader notion of force on the current employ-
ment discrimination legal regime.  Specifically, subconscious 
biases and their relationship to judicial hostility present numer-
ous concerns as to the type of inferences that can accurately be 
made in interpreting fact patterns and the ability of legal deci-
sion makers - both judges and juries - to avoid the influence of 
the very same biases they are tasked with assessing.  
FORCE AND ROLE OF THE STATE 
By engaging Epstein on the utility of the antidiscrimination 
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laws, a basic question arises as to the role of the state in regulat-
ing racially discriminatory conduct.  Epstein’s approach is basi-
cally that of the laissez faire capitalist, arguing for a hands-off 
approach in which discrimination will largely be eliminated by 
markets because of the costs of discriminating.  Under this ap-
proach, the Jim Crow South was an artificial construct and 
Brown v. Board of Education was the normalizing event that, by 
eliminating the state-sponsored exertion of discriminatory force, 
returned markets to their “natural” state.  The natural order re-
stored, markets are poised to do their noble work of eliminating 
inefficiencies and growing the pie.   
The rubric of force presents a different view.  Regardless of 
whether a return to a state of nature can be achieved, the force 
notion compels the view that such a state does not currently ex-
ist.  Instead, implicit biases suggest that pre-Brown attitudes 
may have found a new home in the subconscious.  Cognitive 
biases support this theory and further suggest that, at least as 
long as there are identifiable ingroup and outgroup members, a 
force-free state of nature may never exist.   
As a final point, a view of subtle biases as potentially omni-
present suggests that, because of a dearth of truly objective ac-
tors, a seismic realignment of the current legal regime may be 
needed.  Where all employment decisions involving racial mi-
norities are reasonably likely to be infected with racial bias,96 
perhaps the presumption of nondiscrimination and the burden of 
proof should be reversed.  Indeed, the United States is in the 
minority in its use of the at-will employment presumption.97  
Canada bars dismissals that are “unjust” or not supported by 
“just cause,” and nearly all European countries place a similar 
burden of good cause for dismissal on employers.98   
The force notion raises questions about the viability of a 
model that shifts responsibility from the state to workers, who 
are treated as an army of “private attorneys general.”99  Where 
litigation is costly and the problem of discrimination is perva-
sive, placing the onus on businesses would serve to level the 
playing field by at least aligning burden with resources.100 
CONCLUSION 
Legal philosopher Robert Hale argues that coercive force is not 
created through the application of government regulation or the 
adoption of any particular legal rule.  Rather, the total amount of 
coercion remains constant while its distribution is shifted.101  For 
example, the choice of a particular rule of property, while en-
hancing the rights of the property holder, simultaneously places 
a restriction on the use of that property for all others.  Contrary 
to the suggestion by free market advocates that state regulation 
is the creation of coercion upon private parties, in reality these 
free market proponents simply advocate for a state of affairs in 
which the balance of coercion is struck at one extreme, which 
inevitably favors those with the most capital.  While the capital-
ists run amok, racial minorities are subject to the coercive force 
of history, culture, and cognition.  
 In the employment discrimination setting, anti-
discrimination laws ensure that the balance is not set at the free 
marketers’ extreme, but racial minorities nonetheless labor un-
der too heavy a burden.  Vulnerable to the cognitive bias and 
implicit attitudes of employers, the current balance places the 
onus on victims of racial discrimination to police what is a per-
vasive societal ill, permeating our collective subconscious, with 
little help.  The status quo asks racial minorities who suffer dis-
crimination in the workplace to seek redress in an unknowingly 
hostile judicial forum through the use of a set of clumsy legal 
rules that misunderstand the nature of the problem.  If equality is 
a goal that our society values, a new balance must be struck.  
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The Trouble With Simplicity 
By Walter Benn Michaels.  Metropolitan Press (2006).  ISBN 080507841X  
Reviewed By Shannon Reaves* 
E ssentially, Walter Benn Michaels is correct: there is sharp class division in America that is characterized by gross inequality of opportunity and goes virtually unchallenged in the political 
mainstream.  In his latest book, “The Trouble with Diversity: 
How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality,” 
Michaels suggests that this lack of attention is rooted in our col-
lective obsession with racial and cultural diversity.  He proposes 
that, instead of fixing the problems of a poor underclass created 
by the free market economy, Americans choose to pursue solu-
tions to inequality by focusing upon “diversity.” 
Michaels acknowledges that within the poor, some are ra-
cial minorities, and some are not.  He argues that if we solved 
the issues of the disproportionate racial representation beneath 
the poverty line, while the group would be a more appropriate 
representation of races in that class of society, we would still 
have the same number of underprivileged people.  The end re-
sult, he argues, is that nothing is accomplished, but this is a 
highly debatable conclusion.  Michaels seems to believe that 
race and gender-related inequality should be put aside in an ef-
fort to fix the country’s class issues.  He often treats the two 
concepts as though they are mutually exclusive.  He urges 
Americans to focus on eliminating the differences in wealth that 
exist between the poor and the rich. 
Ignoring race in the reconstruction of class, as Michaels 
suggests doing, would support the imbalance of power that has 
shaped America since its inception.  When America pulls its 
citizens from poverty, into real opportunity, racial discrimina-
tion may still leave people behind.  Michaels does not seriously 
engage in that particular dilemma, even vacillating about 
whether racism actually exists in any significant form in Amer-
ica today. 
In this vein, Michaels questions the legitimacy of identity-
based considerations, such as affirmative action programs.  In 
what may be a determined effort to be shocking and cutting-
edge, Michaels - a self-proclaimed liberal - comes dangerously 
close to advocating the end of most current programs intended 
to level the playing field for visible racial minorities. 
If you can manage to put these problems aside, however, 
what is left of “The Trouble with Diversity” is insightful and 
thought provoking.  Michaels suggests that the U.S. downplays 
its growing economic divide by convincing citizens that the 
country is actually still a meritocracy where, for example, the 
brightest students go to the best schools.  He also indicates that 
the U.S. asserts that the rich and poor are equals, just culturally 
different.  By convincing the population of this, the United 
States sidesteps the issue of actually creating equality of oppor-
tunity.  The trick “is to think of [economic] inequality as a con-
sequence of our prejudices rather than as a consequence of our 
social system and thus to turn the project of creating a more 
egalitarian society into the project of getting people” to stop 
being bigoted. 
His major proposal is for the abolition of private schools 
and for the equal distribution of funding among public schools.  
This would replace the present system, in which schools are 
funded by local property taxes, which results in incredibly well 
funded public schools in wealthy districts and dismally under-
funded public schools in impoverished districts.  Michaels be-
lieves that if the state can provide equal education to all, it 
would advance the opportunity for class mobility for all Ameri-
cans.  However, as the Supreme Court has not looked kindly 
upon efforts to eliminate private schools, this proposal will 
likely remain nothing more than an interesting hypothesis in the 
near future. 
Michaels’s most important message is that focusing on ra-
cial and cultural diversity does not address true economic ine-
qualities in the United States.  Michaels suggests that “poverty” 
is not an identity and does not fit under the “diversity” umbrella.  
It is not African-American or Irish-American, but it is inequal-
ity.  Americans need to fix it, not just find new ways to tolerate 
it.  His overall message is a good one, though his approach of 
both downplaying the importance of race and recommending 
wealth redistribution may turn off readers on both the left and 
the right, respectively. 
Still, “The Trouble with Diversity” is full of interesting 
revelations and out-of-the-box thinking.  The one notable failure 
of the text, however, is that the author proposes engaging the 
class problem at the expense of race, which remains another 
significant dilemma in the U.S.  As a result, Michaels engages in 
the same sleight of hand of which he accuses the nation.  While 
he is quick to point out that America hides the economic divide 
as it “celebrates diversity,” Michaels appears to make racial dis-
crimination disappear while he focuses on issues of class.  While 
acknowledging the role that race plays in the equation is not as 
simple as the contrast he suggests between the rich and the poor, 
considering race is still not superfluous.  It is necessary, and it is 
incredibly complicated - and that is the trouble with diversity.  
 
*Shannon Reaves is a first-year law student at American University Washington College of Law.  
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O n New Year’s Day 2005, the Tarrant County Com-missioners’ Courtroom was at standing-room only for perhaps the first time ever as hundreds of sup-porters gathered to watch Roy C. Brooks1, the 
newly-elected Precinct 1 Commissioner, take the oath of office.  
The candidate’s family had prime seats in the front two rows - 
not only his wife, son, and daughter, but nieces and nephews 
and in-laws, and brothers and sisters by blood and otherwise.  
This day marked the achievement of a long-sought goal, not just 
for the candidate, but also for his entire community of support-
ers.   
There were quieter moments on the program: a gracious 
speech by the outgoing commissioner, a brief tribute by one of 
his community supporters, readings by a few more ministers.  
Even the moment of official business was made personal as the 
candidate was sworn in on the Brooks family bible, the same 
bible in which his parents had recorded the names and birth 
dates of their children years ago.   
Finally, it was the candidate’s turn to speak.  He called his 
family up to the dais and introduced each person by name.  He 
thanked his brother, who was also his campaign treasurer.  He 
thanked his sisters for all of the time and support and, not least, 
money that they had contributed.  The crowd that came out to 
celebrate Roy Brooks’ achievement did not tear themselves 
away from their black-eyed peas just to congratulate a new com-
missioner — most of them probably had no idea what a commis-
sioner actually does.  They came out to celebrate something 
much more important: that they had just elected one of their 
own. 
MAJORITY-MINORITY V. COALITION DISTRICTING:      
THE DEBATE 
The national debate over redistricting and effective minority 
representation generally focuses on how best to draw Congres-
sional and state legislative districts.  The arguments both for and 
against coalition districting2 take for granted the existence of 
large-scale communities of interest among minority voters (i.e., 
that the vast majority of African Americans share common po-
litical interests) and ignore the reality of an aggregate power 
component to the districts.  Those in favor of coalition district-
ing argue that minority influence in the aggregate legislative 
body ultimately is more important than constituent satisfaction 
with an individual representative.  Scholars who are in favor of 
coalition districting argue that blacks and other minorities will 
be much better off when districting maximizes the number of 
legislators who are beholden to black communities for votes, 
because their legislative issues will more likely be brought to the 
table. 3  Under this theory, majority-minority districts, by pack-
ing more black voters into fewer districts, result in less effective 
representation of blacks in the aggregate legislative body.  This 
leads to a ghettoization of black political issues, with only a few 
voices willing to bring those issues to the fore.  This view has 
been gathering support for years, from proponents both black 
and white, and on both sides of the congressional aisle.4  
However, both scholars for and against majority-minority 
districts fail to take into account local political concerns in their 
arguments.  The prevailing wisdom among those in favor of 
coalition districting is that black constituents in a coalition dis-
trict are better served by a moderate or conservative representa-
tive than a liberal representative, because the moderate will be 
better able to garner support for key black issues in the aggre-
gate legislative body.  In this view, legislation dealing with is-
sues of importance to the black community will have a better 
chance of being passed under moderate or conservative repre-
sentation, even if most black voters would prefer a much more 
liberal representative.  The problem with adding up black legis-
lators and black-sympathetic legislators and judging success by 
voting records and committee appointments is that voters are not 
only worried about their statistical representation - the percent-
age of influence they wield within a national body.  They are 
also concerned whether the face of government with which they 
deal regularly looks like them and reflects their experiences.  
The redistricting debate is therefore incomplete without thor-
ough consideration of pertinent issues from the local govern-
ment perspective, where questions of representation and com-
munity identification most affect voters’ daily lives. 
A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE 
This article focuses on the 2004 campaign and election for 
the Precinct 1 Commissioner’s seat in Tarrant County, Texas.  
In a majority white county precinct in north central Texas, four 
candidates competed for the slot: three black candidates battled 
fiercely for the Democratic nomination, and the winner faced the 
Republican candidate, also black, in the general election.  Once 
elected, Roy Brooks took his seat as the only black member of 
the five-member Tarrant County Commissioners’ Court.  This 
article takes a ground-level view of one candidate’s campaign, 
eventual election and initial days in office.  The author explores 
a number of questions.  First, what circumstances did these 
black candidates face as they struggled to distinguish themselves 
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with black voters while still appealing to the white majority?  
Second, how does the new black commissioner balance his or 
her commitment to zealous representation of black community 
interests with a commitment to the majority white constituency?  
Third, how does the only black commissioner maneuver politi-
cally within such a small governmental body?  Finally, what do 
black constituents want from a black county commissioner? 
RUNNING AND WINNING: THE STORY OF A              
COMMISIONER’S COURT RACE 
Tarrant County is the third-largest county in Texas.  Ac-
cording to a 2001 census, its population was estimated at 
1,486,392.5  With the population of neighboring Dallas County 
at approximately 2.3 million6, the combined Dallas County-
Tarrant County region, commonly known as Dallas-Fort Worth, 
is one of Texas’ largest urban centers.  
Racially, Tarrant County is significantly more homogeneous 
than the rest of Texas, with a non-Hispanic white population of 
61.9%, compared with just 52.4% for Texas statewide.  Eco-
nomically, Tarrant is predominantly middle-class, but with a 
striking 10.6% of the county’s 
population living below the pov-
erty line.  Tarrant is also home to 
the billionaire Bass and Mon-
crief families, whose oil fortunes 
are a consistent source of fund-
ing for local civic projects.   
Of Tarrant County’s four 
precincts, Precinct 1 is the most 
racially diverse.  Whites make 
up just 46% of the population of 
Precinct 1, with blacks comprising 31% - two and a half times 
the county average - and Latinos comprising 20%.  Precinct 1 is 
widely economically and socially diverse as well.  The three-
hundred thousand person area stretches from the apartment com-
munities of southeast Fort Worth, where zero-tolerance police 
patrols break-up gatherings of brown and black men on dark-
ened street corners, to the dream-home gated communities of 
southwest Fort Worth, where seven-bedroom palaces stand 
along privately financed, tree-lined avenues.  Politics is no ex-
ception to the pattern of wild diversity in Precinct 1.  It is the 
only majority-Democratic precinct in the county. 
The Precinct 1 Commissioner’s race in 2004 was unique in 
that all the primary and general election candidates, both De-
mocratic and Republican, were black.  With a very popular com-
missioner - the first black and the first woman ever to sit on the 
court - finally retiring after sixteen years in office, several black 
candidates raced to fill the void.  Because a black commissioner 
had held the office for so long, many voters and political opera-
tives in Tarrant County have come to think of Precinct 1 as the 
county’s unofficial black seat.   
The difference between campaigning in black communities 
and campaigning in white communities is not merely one of 
style.  Everyone from campaign managers to party operatives to 
the candidates themselves indicates that different approaches 
and even different substantive methods are offered to each 
group.  This is a little-mentioned effect of coalition districting.  
In a majority-minority district, a candidate hoping to represent 
the views and experiences of a minority community would feel 
free to campaign on those issues, instead of feeling pressured to 
soften certain ideas for the benefit of an audience.  In such a 
district, it would be possible for a black candidate to win based 
on a platform of issues of importance to the black community.  
In a coalition district, though, a candidate cannot win without 
some white support.  And that white support generally comes 
when black candidates successfully soften or dilute their black 
political messages to suit the palates of white voters.    
Election law scholars acknowledge that minority voting 
cohesion and white crossover voting are important factors in 
understanding whether black voters in a given district will suc-
cessfully elect their candidate of choice.7  In their 2001 article 
exploring effective minority districting, Bernard Grofman, Lisa 
Handley, and David Lublin explain that relying solely on the 
minority percentage in a district does not consistently predict 
black election success.  Accord-
ing to Grofman, Handley, and 
Lublin, We also need to incorpo-
rate the level of minority cohesion 
and the degree of white crosso-
ever voting that can be xpected 
when a minority-preferred candi-
date competes for office.  If, for 
example, white voters regularly 
cross over to vote for black candi-
dates, the percentage black necessary to create an effective black 
district decreases.8 
Conversely, if white voters regularly fail to vote for black 
candidates, the black percentage necessary for black voters to 
achieve their preferences in a district increases dramatically.  
Despite moves toward pervasive crossover voting in nearby Dal-
las, and despite the individual successes of a handful of promi-
nent local black candidates, white voters in Tarrant County still 
overwhelmingly prefer white candidates.9   “By and large, white 
voters do not vote for black candidates.” So says Art Brender, 
Chairman of the Tarrant County Democratic Party.  Brender, 
who is white, knows well of what he speaks.  As a civil rights 
attorney who has been involved in several of the recent Texas 
disputes over redistricting, Brender is also a life-long Tarrant 
County resident.  As a result, Brender is intimately familiar with 
the voting patterns and political atmosphere of the region.  But if 
white voters do not vote for black candidates, what makes Pre-
cinct 1, with its succession of black commissioners and its slate 
of black candidates running in a majority white district, an ex-
ception?  Brender points to five factors.  First, the reluctance of 
whites to vote for blacks is less prevalent among lower income 
white voters, such as those who vote in the Democratic prima-
ries.  Second, in the past twenty years, many of the white voters 
who would not be willing to vote for black candidates have 
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Under this theory, majority-minority  
districts, by packing more black voters 
into fewer districts, results in less  
effective representation of blacks in the 
aggregate legislative body. 
switched from the Democratic to the Republican Party.  Third, 
because Precinct 1 has a higher percentage of white voters who 
are Democrats than other areas of the county, there is likely less 
of a racial voting effect by party than would be expected in other 
areas, with all of the blacks voting for the Democratic candidate 
and all of the whites voting for the Republican.  Fourth, in this 
year’s Precinct 1 race, the candidates were particularly attractive 
to white voters, with recognized names and impressive records 
of public service, including a sitting member of the Fort Worth 
city council and the highly visible administrative assistant to the 
popular incumbent commissioner.  Brender especially empha-
sized name recognition as a positive factor for both Brooks and 
Commissioner Bagsby before him.  Finally, Brender acknowl-
edges that what may be the most important factor is also the 
simplest: all of the candidates were black, which diminished any 
racial effect of voting by stripping white voters of any alterna-
tives.   
Despite his candid assessment of white voters’ view toward 
black candidates, Brender is reluctant to admit that the county’s 
Democratic Party operation might sometimes differentiate its 
message on the basis of race.  However, Brender does acknowl-
edge that party workers might be more likely to emphasize civil 
rights themes or include messages by leaders like Jesse Jackson 
when campaigning in a black community, but not in a white or a 
Latino community, where civil rights issues fail to resonate as 
successfully.   
The Brooks campaign was also sensitive to the charge of 
inconsistency in campaigning (as well as, presumably, the more 
disparaging charge of race pandering).  As a result, both Brooks 
and his campaign manager were reluctant to admit differentiat-
ing their message based on race.  When asked whether his cam-
paign ever delivered different messages to different communi-
ties according to race, Brooks replied, “We never altered the 
basic message, but we may have shifted our emphasis on certain 
issues in the overall platform.”10  Brooks had several issues that 
formed the core of his campaign: improved health care, eco-
nomic development, implementing a freeze on senior citizen 
property taxes, and a general pledge to put his superior level of 
experience and knowledge of county government to use for the 
benefit of constituents without lapse in service from the previous 
commissioner.  In an election year when Bush’s characterization 
of John Kerry as a “waffler” may have cost Kerry the presiden-
tial election, Brooks was well aware of the dangers of appearing 
to be inconsistent.  “You become liable to the charge of pander-
ing to different interests,” says Brooks.11   
When asked about the receptiveness of white voters to his 
candidacy, Brooks noted that the senior citizen tax freeze cer-
tainly resonated in white communities because by and large, 
white voters are higher income people and own more expensive 
property than minority voters.  Health care and economic devel-
opment issues were aimed more toward black and Latino com-
munities whose needs are much more basic and whose commu-
nities have not received the same support for basic infrastructure 
- business development, healthcare, and the like.  “[T]o a certain 
degree, there was a tailoring of the message.  But I said the same 
things in the white community,” said Brooks. 
Brooks’ campaign manager, Charmaine Pruitt, had a similar 
take on the question of message differentiation.12  When Pruitt, 
who is black, was asked whether the campaign differentiated its 
message according to race, she said that the message itself did 
not change, but the emphasis did change in certain instances.  
For example, in black neighborhoods, the campaign may have 
focused more heavily on increasing outreach and service for the 
county hospital system, which serves mostly indigent patients.  
In white neighborhoods, the campaign may have focused more 
on economic issues like capping the property tax for seniors.   
The tension between messages that appeal in black commu-
nities and those that appeal to white voters is part of the reason 
why, despite the evident ability of blacks to run and win in Pre-
cinct 1, many black voters in Tarrant County prefer the major-
ity-minority model to the coalition district model.  When asked 
about the viability in Tarrant County of coalition districts that 
rely on white crossover voting to elect minority candidates, 
Brooks said,  
I’m suspicious of the willingness of white 
voters to apply that strategy across the board.  
I think that [white crossover voting] is situ-
ational.  I think this upcoming city council 
election presents some interesting opportuni-
ties for crossover.  Precinct 1 works because 
Democrats are the majority in the precinct, but 
blacks control the Democratic primary.  It 
would be interesting to research exactly why 
blacks are allowed to control the primary.13   
That the battle for the Democratic nomination was centered 
in the black community is not just a consequence of black candi-
dates playing up to black voters.  In Tarrant County, as across 
Texas and the rest of the south, large numbers of white voters 
have turned to the Republican Party in recent years.  As white 
voters leave the Democratic Party and black voters remain, 
blacks gain proportionately more voting power within the 
party.14  Further, in Tarrant County, black voters are somewhat 
more likely than white voters to participate in the Democratic 
primary.  Therefore, for the commissioner candidates, capturing 
a significant number of black votes was essential to winning the 
primary.15  According to Brooks, many white Democrats either 
don’t vote in the primary or vote defensively by voting in the 
Republican primary and voting Democrat in the general elec-
tion. 
When asked whether he would prefer redistricting in favor 
of a smaller number of guaranteed majority-minority districts or 
a larger number of coalition districts with the potential to elect 
minority candidates, Brooks said that he would prefer the guar-
anteed seats: “I think that American society is still polarized, 
and we vote for people who look like us.  For people to vote in 
patterns other than that is the exception, not the rule.”  Perhaps 
things will be different in the future, but Brooks has a clear as-
sessment of the situation as it stands now: “I don’t think we 
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have gotten to that place yet.     
CONSTITUENT SERVICES: THE FOUNDATION OF                      
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Because of its size and function, questions of aggregate leg-
islative power do not apply to the five-member Tarrant County 
Commissioners’ Court.  The court is a governing body, not a 
legislative body, and has no ordinance-making authority.  In-
stead, the county government operates as the local arm of the 
state government, and the Commissioners’ Court acts as the 
county executive, exercising powers specifically delegated to it 
by the state government.  According to Commissioner Brooks, 
the court is authorized to “provide order and structure to the 
county government, to make policies that affect the local imple-
mentation for state programs, and to pay the bills.”16  Specific 
court mandates include the responsibility for operating the state 
criminal justice system, providing health care for the indigent, 
implementing programs for child welfare and mental health and 
mental retardation services, bridging the gap for welfare recipi-
ents between the application for assistance and the receipt of 
federal welfare benefits, and 
maintaining all non-municipal 
roads.   
The court is presided over 
by the County Judge, which is a 
county-wide elected position.  
Because the court does not elect 
its own leader, party affiliation 
and other group identity does not 
come into play.  Any separate 
committee work handled by the court includes all five members 
as a committee of the whole.  With such a small group working 
so closely together, merely forcing initiatives through the system 
based on one party’s superior numbers would make for uncom-
fortable working conditions.  Instead, the commissioners must 
maintain personal relationships with each other, and advocate 
for their constituents behind the scenes as well as on the vote 
tally board.  Additionally, because the court has limited author-
ity to pursue policy-making on the kinds of political issues that 
engage most voters, court members are much more likely to be 
judged based on their relationships with their constituents than 
on what specific legislation they helped to pass or defeat. 
For four-term commissioner Bagsby, Brooks’ immediate 
predecessor and former boss, constituent service was a top prior-
ity.17  In addition to reaching out to citizens’ groups and holding 
community meetings as she had during her initial campaign for 
office, Bagsby took a programmatic approach to constituent 
outreach, beginning with publishing a citizens’ guide to county 
government, which included descriptions of the processes of 
county government and contact information to make services 
more accessible to citizens.  She initiated outreach efforts like 
broadcasting the weekly court meetings on public access televi-
sion, and she created a volunteer coordinator position to encour-
age citizens to become involved in charitable activities through 
the county, such as volunteering at county hospitals.  Bagsby 
also started an immunization project with the local Junior 
League through the county hospitals.  Because of her efforts, the 
county has become much more visible in the community - 
county offices have adopted local elementary schools, and 
county employees drive for Meals on Wheels and are encour-
aged to participate in other charitable efforts.    
Having assisted Bagsby’s successful administration for 
fourteen years, Commissioner Brooks takes constituent outreach 
just as seriously as did his former boss.  When asked what im-
portance he attaches to constituent services as part of his overall 
job description, Brooks answers,  
When you hold office, you don’t operate 
in a vacuum, and you’re not there to serve 
your own needs, but to serve the needs of the 
people who elected you.  The only way to 
know what the people want is to directly com-
municate with the citizenry and get them in-
volved.18   
Brooks therefore counts community meetings as among his 
most important commitments.  
His office hosts some meetings 
and is invited to many more, from 
neighborhood associations to 
senior citizens’ groups to 
churches; he personally attends 
two or three per month.  In addi-
tion to these organized invitations 
from the public, Brooks says his 
office is contacted “many times a 
day” by constituents needing help with personal problems.  
These include anything from a dispute with a landlord to a 
family member in jail.  Brooks tries to help them all, and will 
soon add a staff member whose sole responsibility is commu-
nity outreach and constituent services. 
Brooks’ main programmatic goals for constituent services 
are health care-oriented.  Brooks wants to address local issues of 
health disparity between affluent communities and poorer, espe-
cially minority, communities.  He hopes to be able to direct the 
county-run health system into a community health model, and to 
eliminate the county’s policy of treating undocumented patients 
only in an emergency room setting.  Brooks is also in the proc-
ess of creating a nonprofit entity to partner with community 
groups to apply for grants for community initiatives from SAT 
preparation courses and summer youth camps to senior citizen 
programs.  According to Brooks, “We’ll just have to see what 
the people want.”  
HOW ELECTION LAW SCHOLARS                                    
OVERVALUE LEGISLATIVE POWER 
For some, the coalition district model represents the triumph 
of racial cooperation over the provincialism and polarization 
that often characterizes contemporary politics.  Richard Pildes 
presents coalition districts as an alternative to safe districts 
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For example, in black neighborhoods, the   
campaign may have focused more heavily on      
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hospital system, which serves mostly indigent     
patients.  In white neighborhoods, the campaign 
may have focused more on economic issues like 
capping the property tax for seniors.   
where whites and blacks have achieved “meaningful” political 
cooperation.20  Some believe that this model is just right for 
Texas, where political racial tensions are rooted in a history of 
slavery and de jure segregation.  Tarrant County Democratic 
Party Chairman Art Brender has favored coalition districting 
over majority-minority districting for many years.  Brender 
states, “I’ve said for a long time that the majority-minority 
model is disappearing because of the upward mobility of blacks 
and Hispanics in the region.”21  Brender further explains that 
Tarrant County has seen a trend of generational dispersion 
among black voters: children raised in traditionally black 
neighborhoods like southeast Fort Worth are moving away from 
those neighborhoods as adults.  As a result, it is becoming 
harder in Tarrant County to create separate majority-black vot-
ing districts.  Brender sees coalition districts as the solution to 
this problem.  Although Brender admits that a coalition model 
based on white crossover voting would be unlikely to succeed 
locally, he believes that coalitions of local minority communities 
based on common economic and social interests would be viable 
vehicles for black candidates.  For example, education issues, 
economic issues, health care, and public transportation are com-
mon interests that unite black, Latino, and Asian communities in 
the area, and serve as bases for potentially successful coalition 
districting.   
The story of multi-ethnic coalition districts is especially 
popular among both election law scholars and Democratic Party 
operatives, because it seems to suggest a clear solution for mi-
nority representation.  Communities of underprivileged and mar-
ginalized minority groups would band together to elect represen-
tatives from each other’s communities; thus, helping each other 
achieve fuller, more descriptive representation than any one 
group could achieve on its own.  Further, the Democrats could 
count those seats as safely in the “win” column, meaning that 
Democrats in the aggregate legislative body would have that 
much more power, and would be in a better position to pass leg-
islation of importance to minority communities.  This fails to 
take into account, however, that while minority voters would 
prefer Democratic representatives to those of another party, the 
effective representation debate neglects the fact that they may 
prefer representation by a member of their own community 
above all else.  For example, Carol Swain concludes that black 
voters value the constituent services and community solidarity 
that a black Congressional representative provides, more highly 
than they value the greater influence in the aggregate body that a 
white representative might provide.22  Despite this finding, 
Swain ultimately proposes that coalitional districting with white 
representatives is the best solution for black community repre-
sentation.23  One can only marvel at the willingness of even a 
black academic, a member of the very voting community in 
question, to  disregard the opinions of black voters in her recom-
mendations for achieving the most effective representation of 
those voters.  
 
REALLY SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION: THE          
IMPORTANCE OF HAVING “OUR GUY” IN OFFICE 
In academic parlance, substantive representation exists 
when a representative is effective in promoting a community’s 
interests, regardless of whether that representative is a racial or 
ethnic member of that community.  In contrast, descriptive rep-
resentation exists when a community’s political representative is 
merely a racial or ethnic community member.24  In reality, how-
ever, for many black voters, there is no such thing as being 
“merely” a racial representative.  Racial identity is as important 
a factor in representation as legislative success or party leader-
ship.  In the context of local officials who sit on small bodies or 
hold lone executive positions, and whose official duties often 
lack either the salience or the magnitude to resonate with most 
voters, racial representation can be  one of the most important 
factors voters seek.  A black representative offers the black com-
munity a social and emotional stake in the political process - the 
existence of black officials shows the community that it is possi-
ble for other interested minorities to run for office and win.  
From an academic perspective, a more accessible governmental 
process and the establishment of officials as role models for a 
particular racial community are secondary benefits, external to 
the more important process of maximizing minority-sympathetic 
votes in legislatures.  For many minority voters, however, being 
able to access government through an elected representative 
from one’s own community is truly a substantive concern. 
Does electing a black county commissioner really make for 
better representation for black constituents?  County government 
is certainly not a high-profile enterprise, and many citizens, both 
black and white, are completely unfamiliar with its mission.  But 
according to local community leader Deralyn Davis, having a 
black representative in county government is “not just for show” 
- it is vital to county policy.25  Commissioners are responsible 
for appointments to boards and commissions that bring political 
and monetary benefits to the black community.  For example, 
the Tarrant County Commissioners’ Court appoints members to 
the John Peter Smith Hospital Board, which oversees a county 
hospital system that serves a large percentage of low-income 
and minority patients.  Before Commissioner Bagsby was 
elected, only one black member had ever been appointed to the 
hospital board, despite the fact that black patients comprise ap-
proximately one-third of those served by the John Peter Smith 
system.  It was only after the election of a black commissioner 
to the court that black members became a regular fixture on the 
hospital board.  Davis points out that a governing board is most 
effective when its members contribute a variety of experiences 
and ideals.  Davis gives the example of her service as the first 
woman to serve on the State Prison Board, appointed by then-
Texas governor Mark white.26  Her suggestion resulted in port-
able toilets being brought into the fields where women prisoners 
labored so that they no longer had to relieve themselves in pub-
lic under the eyes of male guards.  None of the male members of 
the board had previously considered this problem.  Similar con-
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cerns of sensitivity and awareness arise in the context of the 
Commissioners’ Court-appointed hospital board.  It is hard to 
know just how attentive an all-white board would be to the par-
ticular needs of its black patients. 
Officials who are members of the minority communities 
they represent have a real stake in the governing of those com-
munities, because they will be personally affected by the out-
comes of the decisions they make.  And voters within a commu-
nity feel a real connection to a representative who looks and 
lives like them.  According to Roy Brooks, “They feel like they 
have a sort of ownership in me.  They helped put me there.”27  
Deralyn Davis sees this sense of personal connection in one’s 
representative as an important part of political participation, and 
she thinks that for Tarrant County, the coalition district model 
threatens that feeling of connection for minority voters.   
According to Davis, the coalition district model is unlikely 
to be successful in electing black candidates, despite the excep-
tions of Bagsby and Brooks in Precinct 1.  Both Bagsby and 
Brooks gained support from a wide range of voters based on 
individual appeal: both were from well-respected Fort Worth 
families whose names tended to overcome doubt among white 
voters, and both had relatively high profiles within the greater 
Fort Worth community based on their professional experiences 
before running for office.  Not every black candidate has such 
advantages when it comes to drawing crossover-voting support.  
Davis fears that without a majority-minority model, black candi-
dates will be unable to win locally, and black voters will lose 
their already limited personal connections to representative gov-
ernment.   
NAVIGATING A FIVE-MEMBER COURT:                               
ONE COMMISIONER’S STORY 
In 1988, Bagsby was the only Democrat elected in Tarrant 
County.  Many of her supporters had backed her because of a 
surrounding sexism controversy, not because they cared about, 
or were familiar with, county government.  One of her first acts 
in office was putting together an informational pamphlet called 
“County Government A to Z,” as one of her many efforts to 
make the Court more accessible to citizens. 
Bagsby felt a conscious responsibility to demonstrate that 
women belonged on the Court and that a minority woman could 
be a competent commissioner.  At first, she experienced “both 
covert and overt hostility” from some members of the court, so 
she was careful to do her homework.28  Bagsby saw that the 
boards and commissions that were appointed by the court were 
not demographically reflective of the local community as a 
whole, so she pushed for term limits for appointed positions and 
nominated qualified minorities and women for vacant spots.  
Bagsby says she knew that other court members were looking 
for a reason to gang up against her, so she made sure always to 
have one or two of them in partnership on any effort, and she 
usually let one of the others present the idea in court meetings.  
“That’s the way women work - they are consensus builders and 
collaborators.”29  But she says it would have been hard for 
someone who needs public validation to operate in such a be-
hind-the-scenes manner.  Bagsby encouraged the court to take a 
critical look at members of the county’s senior staff and evaluate 
them objectively.  She pushed for professionalization of the staff 
with an eye toward encouraging the county’s operations to be-
come technologically up-to-date, and she initiated a tuition reim-
bursement program for employees who wanted to pursue higher 
education.   
The primary goal of Bagsby’s first term in office was to 
change the culture of the court; she did not push for change in 
the delivery of services right away.  But according to Bagsby, 
despite the fact that the changes she initially pushed for were 
mostly internal, she did not have a problem being satisfactorily 
accountable to the black community.  “They were just glad to 
see me there every Tuesday,” she says.30   
Initially, Bagsby’s fellow commissioners were less than 
welcoming.  Perhaps they resented having to share their author-
ity with a black person and a woman.  Perhaps they feared fur-
ther encroachment from communities they felt uncomfortable 
dealing with - once minorities and women started to take an in-
terest in the court, how long would any of their seats be safe?  
Unfortunately, it seems they had no cause for worry.  In the six-
teen years since Bagsby first ran for the court, no minority com-
missioner has been elected from any other precinct, and no black 
candidate has ever run for a seat outside of Precinct 1.  Instead, 
Precinct 1 has become the black seat, the district in which it is 
safe for blacks to run and win.  There is a consistent minority 
presence on the court, but it is sequestered in such a way that 
white members of the court are safe from minority challenges.  
Lani Guinier identified this type of problem in New York’s Vil-
lage Voice,31 arguing that the limited minority presence allowed 
by white elites in their various institutions both legitimizes those 
institutions and insulates the elites from real competition from 
minorities.  She compares the Supreme Court’s ruling in Geor-
gia v. Ashcroft32 with its handling of the affirmative action ques-
tion in the Michigan cases33 and finds that in each case, the 
Court leaves the ultimate choices of redistricting and student 
admissions not to the taxpayer and the voter, but to the power 
elite.   
Precinct 1 seems to fit this model exactly.34  The 1990 and 
2000 redistrictings each increased the proportion of black voters 
in Precinct 1, consequently decreasing the proportion of black 
voters in the other precincts.  By 2004, with four black candi-
dates vying for one commissioner seat, and zero black candi-
dates running in any other race, it seems that the concerns of the 
black community have been successfully relegated to one corner 
of the commissioners’ court.  
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that, on the ground, the debate between majority-
minority and coalition districting is far more complicated than 
the mere amassing of districts to maximize the aggregate legisla-
tive clout of the Democratic Party.  On a local level, black vot-
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ENDNOTES  
ers do not define political efficacy only, or even primarily, ac-
cording to policy implementation.  Instead, they count constitu-
ent services and the ability to identify personally with their rep-
resentatives as their most important concerns.  Black voters, 
therefore, experience the fullest political access, and receive the 
best response from government, when they are represented by 
black elected officials with the political freedom to pursue black 
interests zealously.  Coalition districts do not sufficiently allow 
for this paradigm.  Instead, when black candidates must please 
both minority and white communities, they will differentiate 
their political messages in order to appeal to white voters.  Ma-
jority-black districts allow black communities to experience 
ownership of the political process in a way that coalition dis-
tricts do not.  For the debate over effective minority districting 
to be complete, election law scholars must fully take into ac-
count this sense of empowerment - the value of electing one of 
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Every consumer deserves an equal 
opportunity to access  the credit  
market, and that credit should never 
be withheld because of sex or any 
other factor not related to ability and 
willingness to repay the loan.1 
 
D ecades ago, lenders could refuse to provide credit to qualified borrowers based solely on arbitrary characteristics such as race, religion, or sex.2  Moreover, when faced with equally creditworthy 
loan applicants, lenders would charge certain borrowers higher 
loan rates for no legitimate reason.3  Congress passed the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) 4 to forbid arbitrary discrimi-
nation.5  But, did the ECOA fully protect consumers from facing 
discrimination on the basis of arbitrary characteristics?6 
At the same time that Congress outlawed discrimination in 
“any aspect” of a credit transaction on a prohibited basis, it spe-
cifically allowed “affirmative” discrimination on these same 
grounds.  Any such affirmative action credit program is called a 
“Special Purpose Credit Program” (“SPCP”)7, known as the 
consumer credit equivalent to affirmative action hiring plans.8  
For instance, a disadvantaged Black applicant could legally be 
turned down because of the color of her skin if she applied for 
an SPCP designed for Native Americans.9  Both large and small 
lenders currently offer SPCP programs that make credit avail-
able on preferential terms to certain groups.10 
This article will not take a position on whether affirmative 
action is constitutional or whether it is beneficial for society.  
Rather, this article will argue that SPCPs are limited by equal 
protection principles external to the ECOA.  This question is 
timely because “affirmative action” and equal protection law 
have evolved in the 30 years since the ECOA and its SPCP pro-
vision was first passed.  At least one law firm recently advised 
its clients to be mindful of a challenge to the SPCP under civil 
rights principles, in part, as a result of some of these changes.11  
While the Federal Reserve Board is required to regularly review 
and, if necessary, update the ECOA,12 the SPCP section has re-
ceived only perfunctory changes.13  The Federal Reserve Board 
is unlikely to mandate changes that negate the letter of the law 
in any regulation, including the ECOA, as the Board’s role is 
primarily to write regulations that implement the laws passed by 
Congress.14 
This article is intended to fill a necessary void and analyze 
SPCPs in light of three decades of legal developments.15  Part I 
will provide a brief history of applicable constitutional and civil 
rights law, including the ECOA, to help the reader understand 
the context for SPCPs, and introduce the reader to SPCP pro-
grams.  Part II will propose a multi-step analysis and argue that 
SPCPs are illegal under the equal protection clause.  Part III will 
propose two amendments to the ECOA to ensure that SPCPs are 
available to satisfy special social needs without discriminating 
against any protected class.  Finally, Part IV concludes in sup-
port of fair lending enforcement to advance public policy inter-
ests. 
BACKGROUND-THE EXISTING LAW 
A. IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
   1. EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Equal Protection (“E.P.”) clause16 has evolved substan-
tially during the twenty-first century, as it is considered to be a 
“viable [and] powerful” strategy to challenge inequality.17  Sim-
ply put, the E.P. clause prohibits purposeful18 or “invidious dis-
crimination.”19  Considering that certain classes or groups may 
benefit more than others from virtually any government action,20 
the courts apply one of three tests to assess the constitutionality 
of a challenged behavior.21  An E.P. analysis is essentially iden-
tical under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,22 as the 
primary difference is the level of government at issue.23  How-
ever, the actor need not be a state or federal entity.  Private con-
duct is considered to be state action in several circumstances, 
including conduct authorized by the state, which is significant 
for this article.  Unfortunately, the Court does not have a precise 
test for state-authorized conduct, as it makes a determination 
after weighing the facts in each case.24 
2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW 
An affirmative action program is designed to “change the 
outward and visible signs of yesterday’s racial distinctions and 
thus, to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the 
barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices.”25  
The constitutionality of affirmative action programs is evaluated 
under the equal protection clause because the equal protection 
clause “protect[s] persons, not groups.”26  Tracing their origins 
to New Deal-era labor laws,27 affirmative action programs 
started in the employment context and later expanded to college 
admissions.28  Affirmative action is largely court-defined, as it is 
not expressly authorized in what is considered its statutory gene-
sis, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29  One source of controversy is 
whether the Supreme Court abrogated this “unambiguously co-
lorblind” statute through its decisions to allow affirmative action 
programs,30  or whether its legislative history allows considera-
tion of race “in order to alleviate the historic problem of racial 
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inequity.”31 
Affirmative action law has undergone substantial change in 
the forty years since its inception.  Most affirmative action cases 
are traceable to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
which allowed a public university to consider race as a factor in 
its admissions process.32   The Court recently upheld the funda-
mental holding of Bakke, holding that it was legal to consider 
race as one of many factors,33 yet illegal to automatically favor 
an applicant based on race.34  Nonetheless, the Court will use 
strict scrutiny to determine whether governmental race-based 
affirmative action programs are narrowly tailored to the compel-
ling government interest.35 
The preceding discussion applies only to affirmative action 
plans by governmental entities. The Supreme Court has noted 
that affirmative action programs by private actors do not trigger 
equal protection clause scrutiny.36  Thus, the affirmative action 
principles delineated above will apply only to SPCPs that are 
operated, either directly or indirectly, by the government.  Truly 
private SPCPs need not satisfy these rules.  This section summa-
rized the underlying law pertaining to the affirmative action-like 
component of SPCPs which permit otherwise illegal discrimina-
tion.  The next section introduces these anti-discrimination laws. 
B. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN LENDING  
While the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”) of 1968 generally pro-
hibited discrimination by private actors in housing-related trans-
actions,37 it neither “proscribed” lending discrimination, nor 
established a comprehensive enforcement scheme.38  Thus, the 
CRA was inadequate to protect creditworthy individuals against 
credit discrimination on “often irrational” grounds.39 
The ECOA was passed in 1974 to protect consumers on the 
basis of sex and marital status in response to reports of credit 
practices that ran contrary to the spirit of equality for all.40  For 
instance, the ECOA was initially called a “Women’s Law” 41 
because creditworthy females often had been unable to obtain 
credit in their own names.42  Congress enhanced and expanded 
the ECOA two years later in 1976.43  The ECOA prohibits a 
lender from discriminating in “any aspect” of a credit transac-
tion on the basis of sex, marital status, race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, or exer-
cising certain consumer rights in good faith.44  The ECOA pro-
tects a consumer in all stages of the credit process from the 
lender’s conduct before it receives an application, the decision 
whether to approve the application and on what terms, to the 
treatment of the consumer once becoming a customer.45 
1. OVERVIEW OF SPCPS 
The SPCP was added to the ECOA in 1976.  The three 
types of SPCPs include: those authorized by law for the benefit 
of an economically disadvantaged class;46 those offered by a 
non-profit corporation for its members or an economically dis-
advantaged class;47 and those offered by a for-profit organiza-
tion to meet special needs.48  To qualify, the targeted group need 
not prove historical disadvantage or disparate treatment.49 
Credit unions, as not-for-profit institutions,50 fall into the 
second category.  Thus, while banks and for-profit lenders must 
satisfy legal formalities before establishing an SPCP, a credit 
union can create an SPCP without a formal plan for any group 
or for any reason.51  Credit unions requested and received this 
special treatment compared to other lenders because they feared 
violating the ECOA by restricting lending to their members.52  
Simply put, Congress wanted to permit “church-affiliated credit 
unions” to only serve their members.53  Thus, Congress sought 
to protect credit unions using the SPCP provision. 
SPCPs are intended to help economically disadvantaged 
individuals or meet special social needs.  It is possible that the 
SPCP provision was partially motivated by a federal commis-
sion report54 that recommended low-income individuals receive 
credit on competitive terms, and presented case studies on pro-
grams that help the disadvantaged.  Regardless, Congress had in 
mind programs based on the applicant’s age when creating the 
SPCP for for-profit organizations,55 as Congress did not intend 
to prohibit positive credit programs aimed at “young adults.”56  
SPCPs are clearly not limited to certain age groups, as the three 
examples provided in Regulation B for SPCP programs targeted 
to a specific audience are “race, national origin, or sex.”57 
The SPCP allows creditors to engage in conduct that would 
otherwise be discriminatory.58  A lender may require all partici-
pants in a SPCP to share a “common characteristic,” such as 
age, while barring from the program those who do not meet this 
characteristic.59  A creditor does not have free reign, though.  As 
a lender, the creditor is still subject to all other provisions of the 
ECOA and cannot discriminate other than by requiring this com-
mon characteristic.  SPCPs also cannot be structured to evade 
the requirements of the ECOA.  It is unlikely that a SPCP can be 
used for any residential real estate-related loan program because 
the Fair Housing Act does not include a SPCP exception.60 
2. SPCPS IN PRACTICE 
Just as Congress intended,61 a SPCP may overtly discrimi-
nate against specific protected classes or disparately treat62 cer-
tain groups.  The Federal Reserve Board63 acknowledged this 
when it found that a New York State law that prevented a SPCP 
from being established on the basis of “race, creed, color, na-
tional origin, sex, or marital status” was preempted by the 
ECOA.64  The Federal Reserve Board evidently realized that 
Congress intended to allow SPCPs to discriminate.  Further-
more, while not dispositive of the issue, the United States De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) has stated in court filings that a 
SPCP may be based on race, assuming the program meets all the 
other legal requirements.65 
The Federal Reserve Board proposed to clarify the regula-
tion to indicate that a SPCP “should not have the effect of de-
priving people who are not part of the class of rights or opportu-
nities they otherwise would have.”66  Regardless, federal bank 
examiners are instructed to encourage banks offering SPCPs 
based on a protected class to rename and restructure the program 
based on factors “not prohibited by the ECOA,” such as “first-
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time home buyer.”67 
Indeed, the SPCP is used in a discriminatory manner.  For 
instance, the Virginia Housing Development Authority 
(“VHDA”) precluded unmarried couples from participating in a 
preferential loan program by requiring that the applicants be 
related by “blood or marriage.”68  A federal court dismissed an 
ECOA claim for marital status discrimination on which the 
plaintiff would “plainly prevail”69 because the VHDA program 
was a SPCP authorized by state law.  Additionally, Mobil Oil 
and the former OmniBank offered a SPCP that allowed female 
or minority borrowers preferential treatment in the lending proc-
ess when seeking a loan.70  Credit unions offer preferential 
credit programs targeted to an age group under 62.71  While it is 
unknown how many SPCP programs are in existence, the fed-
eral Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)72 issued a guidance 
letter to the lenders it regulates in response to SPCP inquiries 
from thrifts.73 
THE SPECIAL PURPOSE EXCEPTION IS LIMITED IN 
SCOPE 
A. BASIC OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
SPCP programs face limitations not inherent in the ECOA.  
SPCPs may violate equal protection concepts or exceed the 
scope of the ECOA law.  Based on an equal protection analysis, 
I offer here a multi-step test to gauge their legality.74 
The first step is to determine whether the SPCP discrimi-
nates against a protected class.  The eligibility requirements for 
a SPCP may be based on either neutral factors or on the appli-
cant’s membership in a protected class.  An example of the for-
mer is a program that offers any first-time, low-income home-
buyer with a credit on closing costs.  An example of the latter is 
a program that offers any person under 25 years of age with a 
preferred rate on an installment loan.  Both program structures 
are now legal under the ECOA.  However, it is clear that only 
programs in the first category should be presumed legal.  The 
analysis for the first category of programs will end for purposes 
of this article, although these programs would be illegal if they 
violate the disparate treatment rules of the ECOA.75  By con-
trast, programs in the second category should be suspect owing 
to their use of a prohibited class, and hence proceed to the next 
step of the analysis. 
The next step of analysis is to identify the type of discrimi-
nation.76  Discrimination can occur during either the underwrit-
ing process (when the lender decides whether to approve the 
loan request), or after approval when the terms and conditions 
(such as rates) are set.  For instance, a program that enables 
those under age 25 to receive a credit card regardless of their 
credit history is an example of a lender discriminating during the 
underwriting process, while a program offering a loan rate dis-
count only to women would be an example of discrimination 
through terms and conditions. 
From there, the analysis splits depending on the type of 
discrimination involved.  Any program that offers terms and 
conditions that are preferential compared to ordinary borrowers 
is illegal, as SPCPs are not empowered to discriminate in this 
matter.77  For any program that discriminates in the underwriting 
process, the analysis hinges on whether the SPCP is operated by 
a public or private entity.  If the SPCP is purely private, the 
lender discrimination is authorized because the program falls 
under the SPCP exception to the normal anti-discrimination 
rules of ECOA.  Equal protection principles would not regulate 
the private actor’s conduct.  If the SPCP is public or governmen-
tal, the proper level of scrutiny to evaluate the SPCP is deter-
mined based on the protected class at issue.  This article argues 
that all SPCPs, even those offered by private lenders, must be 
analyzed in this way. 
The 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment generally provide 
no protection against discrimination committed by private ac-
tors.78 Thus, an equal protection claim against a private entity 
for a discriminatory program will fail if the lender is not (either 
directly or indirectly) a state actor.79  
However, the Constitution prohibits discrimination by a 
private entity when there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between 
the government and the lender’s questionable practice.80 The 
government must provide sufficient encouragement, “either 
overt or covert,” to make it responsible for the practice.81  In the 
words of Judge Friendly, “the state must be involved not simply 
with some activity...alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plain-
tiff but with the activity that caused the injury...the state action, 
not the private action, must be the subject of complaint.”82 For 
example, governmental authorization does not exist when a stat-
ute governs deregulated, traditional business conduct,83 yet does 
when the law creates a climate in which private parties may 
choose to discriminate.84   
SPCPs easily fit the second category as the SPCP creates an 
exception that permits discrimination that would otherwise be 
illegal; it is essentially a “statutory invitation to private actors to 
discriminate.”85  In other words, lenders would be unable to 
practice illegal discrimination but for the government’s SPCP 
exception. This is clearly an invitation to discriminate; the gov-
ernment is the root cause of the private actor’s discrimination. 
One commentator has noted that the Supreme Court will find 
invitations to discrimination to be state action, as enticing dis-
crimination is different from allowing the free market to inde-
pendently develop.86 Consequently, all SPCPs must be analyzed 
as state-administered programs. 
B. WHY STATE ADMINISTERED SPCPS FAIL EQUAL 
PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
This section will analyze SPCPs that are expressly state 
authorized or considered state actions.87  In reality, though, this 
discussion applies to all SPCP programs since, as shown earlier, 
all SPCP programs are government authorized.  To recap, the 
alleged state interest in allowing governmental entities and non-
profits to create SPCPs is to help an “economically disadvan-
taged class of persons,” for credit unions to serve their members, 
and allow private entities to meet “special social needs.”88 
A court performs the Equal Protection Clause analysis using 
the appropriate level of scrutiny.  The court will use an interme-
diate scrutiny test for sex, strict scrutiny for race, color, religion, 
and national origin, and rational basis scrutiny for marital status, 
age, receipt of public assistance income, or exercising certain 
consumer rights in good faith. 
1. ANALYSIS UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY: RACE, COLOR, RE-
LIGION  & NATIONAL ORIGIN 
Affirmative action programs based on race or national ori-
gin must use a strict scrutiny, or narrowly tailored, least dis-
criminatory89 means to meet a compelling state interest.90  Any 
SPCP based on classifications that are subject to strict scrutiny 
(race, color, religion, and national origin) fails this test. 
The Supreme Court has held that any person has “the right 
to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitu-
tion justify any racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny,” and that 
“benign” discrimination cannot be held to a lower standard of 
scrutiny.91  The Court later went a step further, and struck down 
a university admissions program that automatically favored ap-
plicants on the basis of race.92  The Court applies strict scrutiny 
to suspect programs based on color, religion, or national origin. 
Regarding SPCPs, the Fifth Circuit found an analogous 
federal program unconstitutional.  In Moore v. USDA, the plain-
tiff was denied financing from a USDA program designed to 
help “socially disadvantaged groups” due to his race, as the noti-
fication letter stated, in part, “No Whites.”93  Although his Fifth 
Amendment equal protection claim failed for seeking monetary 
damages and not equitable relief, the plaintiff succeeded in his 
ECOA claim.94 
A SPCP is not the least discriminatory means to accomplish 
Congress’s stated goal or to serve its intended purpose.  For in-
stance, consider the situation of an immigrant from an impover-
ished Eastern European nation who owns a small business in an 
impoverished community, yet would be precluded, simply be-
cause of skin color, from participating in a major bank’s SPCP 
offering preferential underwriting standards.95  The stated goal 
of helping the economically disadvantaged is clearly not served 
when a business is unable to receive special financing terms 
because of the owner’s race or national origin.  Consequently, 
any SPCP that is structured based on a particular class of indi-
viduals benefits solely that class and excludes similarly situated 
individuals in other classes. 
Likewise, it would clearly be more effective to offer credit 
under a streamlined program to any individual without a credit 
history, rather than only to those who share an arbitrary or im-
mutable characteristic (such as age).  In other words, a program 
structured around neutral factors, such as economic need, would 
be the most beneficial to society and most effectively fulfill 
Congress’ stated goals.96  Perhaps this is why President Clinton 
shifted the focus of affirmative action policy solely from mem-
bership in a protected class to residence in an economically dis-
tressed area as defined by poverty and unemployment data.97  
Consequently, the least burdensome means test is not satisfied 
by SPCPs. 
Additionally, Congress could have clarified that a credit 
union may only lend to its members without creating a much 
broader exception that favors credit unions over banks with re-
spect to the ECOA.98  Therefore, these SPCPs are not narrowly 
tailored (nor the least discriminatory means) to meet Congress’ 
goals of helping economically disadvantaged individuals, pro-
tecting credit unions, or meeting special social needs.99  Disad-
vantaged individuals and credit union members will receive the 
same credit opportunities when a SPCP is structured on a neutral 
basis. 
2. ANALYSIS UNDER INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: GENDER 
Gender discrimination is evaluated using intermediate scru-
tiny, although recent cases indicate that it is an elevated level of 
intermediate scrutiny review.100  A program that discriminates 
on the basis of gender violates the equal protection clause, 
unless it serves an important governmental interest101 and has an 
exceedingly persuasive justification.102  For instance, it was ille-
gal to grant alimony in a divorce to the wife only, as the Court 
held that it was not appropriate to use gender as a proxy for need 
or assume the male was the primary breadwinner.103  Interest-
ingly, gender-based affirmative action programs are less likely 
to be invalidated than race-based programs.104 
Nonetheless, the outcome of SPCPs using intermediate 
scrutiny is the same as with strict scrutiny earlier.  Specifically, 
courts will review the stated purpose of any affirmative action 
program to ensure its legality.105  As one court stated, “when 
government undertakes affirmative action, it must present a 
‘strong basis in evidence’ for doing so.”106 
Here, Congress failed to adequately support its decision to 
implement this affirmative action program to discriminate based 
on a protected class.  The House hearings do not discuss the 
SPCP provision, except for testimony by an industry representa-
tive who sought an exemption from the ECOA for “negative 
discrimination that results in the denial of credit” or “reverse 
discrimination” programs.107  The House hearings included testi-
mony on “affirmative approaches” by lenders, which were tar-
geted to underserved, inner-city areas as much as they were de-
signed to help “minority businessmen.”108  The Senate hearings, 
interestingly, refer to the House hearings as being the justifica-
tion for the SPCP exception.109  Therefore, SPCPs based on gen-
der must fail because Congress failed to provide the requisite 
strong justification. 
3. ANALYSIS UNDER RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY: MARITAL 
STATUS, AGE, RECEIPT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE INCOME, OR 
GOOD FAITH  EXERCISE OF CERTAIN CONSUMER RIGHTS 
It is possible some SPCPs could be based on a protected 
category within the ECOA, yet be subject only to rational basis 
constitutional scrutiny.110  For example, a program could offer a 
credit card to customers between ages 18 and 25 without regard 
for the applicant’s length of credit experience. This program is 
discriminatory against older borrowers who do not have credit 
histories, as these older borrowers are, at a minimum, not en-
couraged to apply, and would be subject to the normal under-
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writing criteria that would preclude them from obtaining credit. 
It is likely that a SPCP based on any category reviewed 
using rational basis scrutiny would satisfy an equal protection 
analysis.  Under rational basis scrutiny, a law is upheld assum-
ing its means are, at least remotely, related to a health, safety, or 
moral concern of government, even if there is a less discrimina-
tory policy available.111  Additionally, courts will give particular 
deference to the legislature on social and economic legisla-
tion.112  In short, courts give broad deference to the government 
when conducting a review using the rational basis standard.113  
Thus, a SPCP structured on any of these criteria would meet 
constitutional scrutiny. 
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
Since SPCPs are presumably illegal under equal protection 
analysis in light of the information presented above, the ECOA 
must be amended.  This is because a SPCP should never be 
based on a protected class, and credit unions should be held to 
the same standards as banks under the ECOA.  Two amend-
ments are proposed below. 
First, the ECOA should be amended to prevent membership 
in a protected class from being a prerequisite for participation in 
a SPCP.  This may be accomplished by adding a provision to § 
1691(c) that states, “A credit assistance or special purpose credit 
program may not base its eligibility guidelines upon whether a 
person is a member of a class of persons defined in § 1691(a).”  
This amendment would preserve Congress’s intent to enhance 
the credit opportunities available to the disadvantaged, yet 
would protect a person from discrimination based on immutable 
characteristics such as race or sex.  The change would also en-
sure that SPCPs are subject to relaxed judicial scrutiny.114 
For instance, a hypothetical SPCP designed to help those 
without established credit histories should not be limited to only 
those under age 25, as older individuals may not have credit 
histories due to legitimate reasons such as being a recent immi-
grant to the United States or heritage from a culture that shuns 
traditional financial service providers.  A hypothetical program 
based on class helps borrowers solely of a specific class who 
have a credit problem, and not those in other classes with the 
same credit problem.  If the fair lending laws are relevant, a 
lender should not be given the flexibility to discriminate when a 
viable alternative is available to prevent discrimination. 
Second, credit union issues require another amendment to 
the ECOA.  As described earlier, credit unions are broadly 
granted more flexibility than banks to use SPCPs to discrimi-
nate.  However, this is not the only way that credit unions re-
ceive favorable treatment under the ECOA.  The National Credit 
Union Administration (“NCUA”) enforces federal credit unions’ 
compliance with the ECOA.115  The NCUA must refer to the 
DOJ all patterns or practices of ECOA violations that involve 
either illegal discrimination in “any aspect”116 of a credit trans-
action or the improper discouragement or denial of applica-
tions.117  The DOJ provides Congress with an annual report 
summarizing the ECOA referrals it receives from the federal 
regulatory agencies.118  These reports indicate that the NCUA 
has made no referrals to DOJ, while the four bank regulatory 
agencies have referred dozens of substantive ECOA violations 
to DOJ.  For instance, a General Accounting Office Report 
showed that the NCUA made none of the 53 referrals between 
1990 and 1995,119 and none of the 140 cases sent to DOJ be-
tween 1999-2004.120 
On the one hand, the fact that the NCUA referred no ECOA 
matters to DOJ could be an excellent sign because it suggests 
that credit unions are in compliance with the fair lending laws.  
Granted, credit unions are often smaller and less complex than 
many banks, thereby indicating less fair lending risk.121  A for-
mer NCUA administrator even testified before Congress that 
credit unions are “different” from other lenders because they “do 
not deal with the general public” but rather those affiliated 
through a common bond.122  Alternatively, it could indicate ei-
ther that the NCUA is not making referrals to DOJ when re-
quired, or the Interagency Fair Lending Procedures are not being 
properly implemented during examinations of federal credit un-
ions. 
Unfortunately, based on the author’s review of credit union 
websites in April of 2005, it appears that the second scenario 
may be true.123  Congress intended the mandatory referral provi-
sion of the ECOA to be an “enforcement mechanism” when 
adding it to the ECOA in 1991.124  Credit unions already receive 
preferred treatment compared to banks in other areas.125 Con-
gress did not intend for the NCUA to put a low priority on the 
ECOA.126  This is particularly important as credit unions are 
becoming more analogous to banks by getting larger, more com-
plex, and merging together. 
Therefore, §1691 (c)(2) should be amended to clarify that 
credit unions can lend to their members without violating the 
ECOA, but may not otherwise receive less scrutiny than banks 
when establishing a SPCP.  The change can be accomplished by 
revising §202.8(a)(2) to read, “It is not a violation of this section 
for a nonprofit organization to extend credit only to its members.  
A nonprofit organization may also create a special purpose pro-
gram to meet special social needs pursuant to the standards pre-
scribed in regulations by the Board.” 
It is essential that the extra discretion given to credit union-
run SPCPs be eliminated and their rules mirror those for private 
lenders.   As mentioned earlier, Congress intended this provision 
simply to protect credit unions from ECOA challenges.  Amend-
ing this provision will allow Congress to clarify that credit un-
ions may not use a credit assistance program to discriminate 
without first meeting the same requirements as a bank.  After all, 
it does not matter to a consumer whether she is discriminated 
against by a SPCP operated by a bank or a credit assistance pro-
gram operated by a credit union.  These proposed changes to the 
ECOA will ensure that every creditworthy consumer has equal 
access to credit regardless of immutable or arbitrary characteris-
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 S 535 “THE EMMETT TILL UNRESOLVED CIVIL RIGHTS 
CRIME ACT” 
This bill would establish an Unsolved Crimes Section in the 
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.  It would 
also create an Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Investigative Office 
in the Civil Rights Unit of the FBI. 
Named in honor of the Emmett Till, whose murder in Mis-
sissippi in 1955 was one of the catalysts of the American Civil 
Rights Movement, this bill would act as the benefactor for a 
crucial area of civil rights crime work: unresolved civil rights 
crime.  It would partition and allocate resources to individual 
divisions in the agencies that could be devoted solely to working 
on cases whose resolutions remain in limbo. 
Till himself was shot, beaten, and left in the Tallahatchie 
River by two white men, who were acquitted at trial but later 
confessed.  The jury deliberations took only 67 minutes, and the 
blasé attitudes of the all-white jury (one juror took a soda break 
to stretch the deliberation time to over an hour) led to public 
outrage in the United States and Europe, and helped kick the 
Civil Rights Movement into high-gear. 
Sen. Dodd (D-CT) introduced the bill for himself and Sen. 
Leahy (D-VT).  It is currently in the Judiciary Committee.  A 
companion bill, H.R. 923, was introduced by Rep. John Lewis 
(D-GA).  It currently has 66 cosponsors. 
 
H.R. 998 “CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY PROJECT ACT OF 
2007” 
This bill would create a project to collect oral histories of 
individuals from the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in the Li-
brary of Congress and the Smithsonian, and these oral accounts 
would then be available to the public. 
The purpose of the bill is to help American citizens learn 
about the CRM through a vital primary source: oral histories.  
The legislation emphasizes allowing future generations, who 
would not necessarily have contact with persons involved in the 
CRM, to be able to relive the history, struggles, and traditions of 
the era.  The project would have tremendous reach, as it would 
help coordinate all preexisting efforts to archive oral histories at 
the national level.  It would also complement previous work that 
has been done to archive other primary source materials on the 
CRM.  There is also an emphasis on assisting local efforts to 
preserve similar oral histories. 
Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY) introduced the bill, which 
has 35 co-sponsors.  It is currently in the House Committee on 
House Administration. 
 
 
S. 543 “DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AND VOTER              
INTIMIDATION PREVENTION ACT OF 2007” 
This bill makes a number of technical amendments to Sub-
section (b) of section 2004 of 42 U.S.C. 1971(b), in order to 
crack down on reporting false election information and any de-
ceptive practices in federal elections. 
The legislation acknowledges that the right to vote is a fun-
damental Constitutional right and an underpinning of democ-
racy.  The bill’s findings recognize that huge strides have been 
made in voter rights, particularly since the era of literacy tests, 
poll taxes, and property requirements.  The bill also recognizes 
the Constitutional legacy of piecemeal inclusion of more and 
more citizens with franchise.  This includes the 15th, 19th, and 
24th Amendments. 
However, despite much forward progress, tactics that aim to 
confuse certain demographics of voters and suppress voter turn-
out threaten today's elections.  Principal among these new tactics 
are the dissemination of false information, intimidation of voters 
to dissuade them from voting, and attempts to influence those 
who do vote. 
There are countless examples of this voter intimidation and 
influence. African-American voters in North Carolina received 
false information about their voter registration status in 1990 
and were threatened against trying to vote.  In 2004, Native 
American voters in South Dakota were turned away unnecessar-
ily at polls for lack of photo identification.  In the 2006 election, 
some Virginia voters received messages telling them that they 
were ineligible to vote and threatening criminal prosecution if 
they tried.  In 2006, in predominately African-American districts 
of Prince George's County, Maryland, certain candidates distrib-
uted fliers insinuating that they belonged to the party of which 
they were not members. 
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) introduced this bill, which 
has notable co-sponsors, including Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY), 
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and Sen. John Kerry (D-MA). 
 
S. 556 “HEAD START FOR SCHOOL READINESS ACT” 
This bill would make technical amendments to provisions 
of Head Start (42 U.S.C. 9831), one of the most important social 
programs for lower-income schoolchildren.  The bill’s authors 
recognize the vital role that Head Start plays in the social and 
cognitive development of many of these children. 
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) introduced this bill, and it is 
currently in the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions. 
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S. 358 “GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION 
ACT OF 2007” 
This bill would regulate and bar certain types of discrimina-
tion based on genetic information, including discrimination in 
health insurance and employment discrimination. 
Recognizing that advances in science and medicine with 
respect to genetics hold the possibility of great societal ad-
vances, the authors of this bill also recognize the potential nega-
tive byproducts that the disclosure of genetic information brings. 
The bill recognizes that although genes are facially neutral 
markers, many genetic conditions and disorders are both more 
prevalent and more readily associated with particular racial and 
ethnic groups.  This could lead to the stigmatizing of, and dis-
crimination against, members of a particular group as a result of 
that genetic information.  An example of this phenomenon is the 
occurrence of certain types of discrimination against African 
Americans in the 1970s based on their higher tendency toward 
sickle-cell anemia. 
Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME) introduced the bill, which 
currently has 25 co-sponsors and is in the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions.  Its companion bill is H.R. 493. 
 
 
 
H.R. “NO MORE TULIAS: DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT 
EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IMPROVEMENT                    
ACT OF 2007” 
This bill seeks to “increase the evidentiary standard re-
quired to convict a person for a drug offense, to require screen-
ing of law enforcement officers or others acting under color of 
law, participating in drug task forces, and for other purposes.” 
The bill’s authors have come to the realization that some 
programs funded by the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assis-
tance Grant program have created and sustained racial dispari-
ties, corruption in law enforcement, and the commission of civil 
rights abuses across the country. The Edward Byrne program 
funds hundreds of regional anti-drug task forces.  As these task 
forces are administered by local officials with very little federal 
oversight, racial and law enforcement issues have cropped up 
and hampered the program’s effectiveness to combat drug prob-
lems while remaining race-neutral.  The ACLU and other watch-
dog organizations have documented numerous occasions of lo-
cal programs administered under the EBMJAG program presid-
ing over false arrests and convictions. 
The bill hopes to both streamline procedures for local pro-
grams receiving federal funds and ensure that states administer 
proper oversight to these programs. 
*Daniel Raposa is a second-year law student at American University Washington College of Law.  
Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) introduced the bill, and it 
is currently in the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security. 
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